Public Diplomacy in Grand Strategy

Ben D. Mor

University of Haifa

Despite the growing importance of public diplomacy in current international politics, its practice—and particularly its relationship with hard power—remains largely unexplored by diplomatic or strategic theory. This paper applies a grand-strategic perspective to analyze the challenges of “winning hearts and minds” in the new communications and normative environments. Israel’s experience in the second Intifada serves to draw empirically based lessons on the grand-strategic relationship between propaganda and counterterrorist operations. This relationship, the case study shows, is shaped by the close proximity of tactical-level events to the “surface” of grand strategy, to which their effects tend quickly to rise in the new communications environment. In this context, the proactive role of public diplomacy becomes a key to grand-strategic success.

As the dust settles over the Iraq War, it is already clear that one of the key lessons it has to offer relates to the central role that the struggle over public opinion occupied in the strategies of the adversaries. In fact, the modern battlefield, as it was revealed in the war, is as much concerned with how military power is captured by the camera and portrayed in the media as it is with how this power is applied against the enemy. Political control over military moves now seems more critical than ever, given that impressions can be more real in their consequences than the military reality that they mirror.

Although war appears to condense and intensify the complex relationship between force and its appearance, it is but a uniquely dramatic instance of a broader phenomenon. In the past two decades, the communications revolution and the global spread of democratic norms have combined to produce a new international environment, in which “the battle over hearts and minds” defines an arena that no government can afford to ignore. In this arena, power flows from images and reputations, whose relationship with what states actually do—or are—is not necessarily direct (Jervis 1970:10). This opens up the possibility of acquiring influence through impression management, not only as damage control—to protect a threatened image—but as an integral part of policy planning. This is the concern of public diplomacy, which seeks to persuade foreign elites and publics that the values, policies, and actions of the state deserve their—and their government’s—support. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy recognized the significance of this means of influence when it stated in its 2002 report that “it is essential to recognize that U.S. foreign policy has been precariously weakened by a failure to systematically include public diplomacy in the formulation and implementation of policy” (U.S. Advisory Commission 2002).

Despite the growing importance of public diplomacy in war and peace, diplomatic theory is still dominated by a concern with government-to-government communication and with the application of “objective,” “hard” power; perceptions,
images, and impressions—especially when they pertain to public opinion—are not at the forefront of analysis. Even less attention has been devoted to the interplay between “hard” and “soft” power in the foreign policies and interactions of states. The level at which these two sources of national influence interact is the level of grand strategy. But although the concept is not new and has been studied in connection with the war policies of states, there is much less practical experience to analyze when it comes to the softer forms of influence that the communications revolution has made available. The same may be said with respect to harder forms of power, which have also undergone change, as the September 11 attack demonstrates. In other words, grand strategy is a familiar concept, but it is far from clear what it means and how it operates in the current international environment.

This is the research question with which the current paper is concerned. The next section starts off with a conceptual analysis of grand strategy, following the work of Liddell Hart and other strategists who examined this concept in the context of traditional power. The discussion then continues with an evaluation of the changes that the communications revolution has effected in the relationship between diplomacy and force. More specifically, the parameters that shape the current communications environment are analyzed in terms of their implications for the conduct of military operations and public diplomacy. The third section takes a look at the Israeli experience in Operation Defensive Shield (March–April 2002), which provides an opportunity to study in an empirical setting various issues that were raised in the theoretical analysis. Finally, in the last section, the lessons and implications of the Israeli case are examined for what they reveal about the grand-strategic relationship between military force (in counterterrorist operations) and public diplomacy.

Public Diplomacy and Grand Strategy

The Nature of Grand Strategy

In Strategy (1967), Liddell Hart analyzes the relationship between strategy, grand strategy, and policy. He argues that Clausewitz’s definition of strategy as “the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war” has two defects. First, it blurs the distinction between strategy and policy, or between government, which is responsible for “the higher conduct of the war,” and the military leaders, which the government “employs as its agents in the executive control of operations.” The second defect of the Clausewitzian formulation is its restrictive view of strategy: “it narrows the meaning of “strategy” to the pure utilization of battle, thus conveying the idea that battle is the only means to the strategical end” (p. 333).

With these two reservations in mind, Liddell Hart then proposes that strategy be defined as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy” (p. 335). It should now be clear that strategy is subordinate to policy, and—given that the government is responsible for policy—that the commander is subject to control by the government. In addition, the use of the term “military means” (in lieu of Clausewitz’s “battles”) broadens the meaning of strategy beyond actual fighting.

The next stage in Liddell Hart’s analysis consists of distinguishing two meanings of “policy” as it relates to war: first, there is “the policy which guides the conduct of war”; second, there is “the more fundamental policy which should govern its object” (p. 335). Grand strategy is “practically synonymous” with the former meaning. Its role is “to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of

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1 Soft power is about obtaining desired outcomes through attraction rather than threat or coercion (Nye 1990).
2 With the phrase “ends of policy” substituting for Clausewitz’s “the object of war,” Liddell Hart’s definition may have strayed too far from the war-oriented conception of strategy. In fact, only a page separates this definition from the observation that “the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war” (p. 336).
nations, toward the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy” (pp. 335–336, emphasis added). In relation to strategy, then, grand strategy is more encompassing, in terms of both the resources it uses and its horizon. On the latter, Liddell Hart writes that “whereas strategy is only concerned with the problem of winning military victory, grand strategy must take the longer view—for its problem is the winning of the peace” (p. 362). This difference in horizons implies that strategy sometimes has to be restrained for the sake of grand strategy, particularly when the pursuit of military decision—toward which the state may need to use all its available force—results in self-exhaustion and a more bitter, resolute, and united opponent.3

The idea that grand strategy spans war and peace was further reinforced during the Cold War, when the nuclear revolution made war unthinkable and consequently the objective of strategy became its prevention. With the addition of peacetime deterrence to the scope of strategy, grand strategy attained its current inclusive meaning: “in modern terms, grand strategy came to mean the adaptation of domestic and international resources to achieve security for a state” (Rosecrance and Stein 1993:4; emphasis added).4

The components of grand strategy are as varied as its scope would suggest. Beyond the application of military means, Kennedy (1991) has argued for a focus on three groups of factors: (1) scarce national resources, which constitute the means that must be balanced against the ends of policy; (2) peacetime and wartime diplomacy, which is concerned with “improving the nation’s position—and prospects of victory—through gaining allies, winning the support of neutrals, and reducing the number of one’s enemies (or potential enemies)” (p. 5); and (3) national morale and political culture, which govern the public’s willingness to bear the costs and burdens of national security.

One way of conceiving the structural relationship, within grand strategy, between these components and the military one has been suggested by Luttwak (2001:209): “[...] grand strategy may be seen as a confluence of the military interactions that flow up and down level by level [technical, tactical, operational, theater], forming strategy’s “vertical” dimension, with the varied external relations among states forming strategy’s “horizontal” dimension.” Although this image does not maintain a clear enough separation between action (what the state does at each level) and outcome (what it obtains when its strategy interacts with the opponent’s), from a research perspective it calls attention to the relationship between, on the one hand, grand strategic design and, on the other, interaction outcomes at the grand strategic level. The design stage is of course informed by expectations about outcomes, but these expectations must be based on some conception of how grand-strategic outcomes are produced, namely on how the interaction among the various components of grand strategy operates in reality.

For example, Luttwak attributes the success of the North Vietnamese in the Vietnam War to a grand strategy that effectively compensated for weakness in the vertical (military) dimension with strength in the horizontal dimension: the military campaign, which was incapable of defeating American troops in battle, was designed to prolong the war so that diplomacy and propaganda could undermine public support for it in the U.S. and among its allies. This perspective suggests that an explanation for the occasional puzzling defeat of great powers at the hands of minor ones is to be found at the grand-strategic level, where non-military factors

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3 However, as Howard’s (1991) discussion of British grand strategy in World War I reminds us, even the civilian strategist is often forced to relinquish grand-strategic plans when they are foiled by immediate military and political realities.

4 This definition strikes a middle ground between broader conceptions (e.g., Kennedy 1991:5), approaching the execution of foreign policy as such, and more restricted ones (e.g., Earle 1971:viii), which maintain the original relationship with war.
(which usually do not find their way into calculations of relative “power”) can sometimes compensate for inferiority in the hard currency of military resources. Thus, focusing only on the vertical dimension of strategy can be misleading in both predicting and accounting for conflict outcomes.

How misleading depends on the interrelationships among the various components of grand strategy and on the broader, systemic context in which it is applied. Military technology, communications, and norms are some of the factors that shape the context within which grand strategy unfolds; when this context changes, grand-strategic success depends on decision makers’ ability to acknowledge the new environment and adjust grand strategy accordingly. In recent years (and especially after the September 11 attack), the growing importance of the communications revolution has led in the U.S. and elsewhere to a re-evaluation of grand strategy and to a corresponding acknowledgment of the role that public diplomacy should play in it.

Public Diplomacy in the International Environment

Manheim (1990:4) defines public diplomacy as “efforts by the government of one nation to influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign policy of the target nation to advantage.” This formulation (which could also encompass strategic bombing or a terrorism campaign) omits the persuasive nature of the interaction, as well as its channel and form. Another influential definition, this one by Tuch (1990:3), addresses these features, but loses Manheim’s emphasis on intended foreign-policy effects: “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”

The two definitions also reflect a common distinction between public diplomacy’s long-term, culture-based activities and its short-term, current affairs focus (see Signitzer and Coombs 1992:140; Gilboa 1998:58; Leonard, Stead, and Smewing 2002:10–11).5 Mass media activities of the latter type make public diplomacy difficult to distinguish from propaganda, although scholars who seek to escape the negative connotations of the latter prefer not to identify it with the former (e.g., Manheim 1994:132; Nye 2004:107). However labeled to avoid the offensive association with propaganda, public diplomacy is but a form of the latter, at least in its current affairs focus: it is, as Kunczik (1997:12) defines PR (and propaganda) for the nation state, “the planned and continuous [public] distribution of interest-bound information by a state aimed (mostly) at improving the country’s image abroad.”6 In the process envisaged by public diplomacy as political influence, the manipulated image of the state should ultimately translate—primarily through its effects on foreign public opinion—into political outcomes that are more favorable to the state.7

Indeed, it could be argued that this form of influence is particularly suitable to the post-Cold War environment, where three broad trends have merged to create favorable conditions for public diplomacy:8 the long-term trend of democratization,

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5 Leonard, Stead, and Smewing (2002:11) argue that of the three main activities of public diplomacy, news management and proactive strategic communications are aimed at the short to medium run, whereas relationship building is geared to the long run.
6 “Public diplomacy” and “propaganda” are used interchangeably in this paper. Current propaganda scholarship tends to treat the concept as ethically neutral (e.g., Jowett and O’Donnell 1992:4; Welch 1993; Taylor 1995:8; but see Cunningham 2002, for a dissenting view). The question of whether public diplomacy is propaganda is debated in Hess and Kalb (2003:223–236).
7 For an interesting empirical example involving the Kuwaiti government and the American PR giant Hill and Knowlton, see MacArthur (1992) and Manheim (1994).
8 Despite being attuned primarily to the realities of hard power, some realists detected these trends decades ago. Herz (1981:187) and E. H. Carr (1964, originally published in 1939) are notable examples.
which has nearly doubled the number of democracies in the 1990s alone;\(^9\) the outcome itself of the Cold War, which has promoted a U.S.-inspired normative order; and the unprecedented revolution in the means of communication, which has broken down previous state (and market) barriers, globalizing and homogenizing data, perceptions, images, and knowledge.

The significance of the first trend is that public opinion has become a factor of increasing importance and weight in the foreign policies of many states. The implication of the second trend is that foreign public opinion is best influenced through *soft power* means (Nye 1990) rather than threat or force, consistent with the role and status of persuasion in democratic society. The third trend has brought about the lessening dependence of citizens on their governments and the local press for information on foreign events, and has vastly increased the potential targets for the *direct* communication of diplomatic messages. All three developments conform to and enhance the characteristic components of public diplomacy as a form of influence.

Without doubt, these trends are not uniformly distributed across the international system and do not impinge equally on the foreign (and domestic) policies of all states. But no other set of norms rivals the democratic one as a *medium* of international discourse and justification; indeed, public diplomacy campaigns aimed at the developed world incorporate its values and norms.\(^{10}\) Likewise, the influence of the information revolution is not restricted to the developed world, as is evidenced even—and perhaps precisely—in the resistance it meets from some non-democratic governments.\(^{11}\) Furthermore, one should not underestimate the exploitation of new technologies in third-world public diplomacy that is aimed at the developed world, especially at the U.S. (Manheim 1990).

All this should not obscure the continuing relevance of force (or hard power) to many interstate relations—and now increasingly to combating terrorism—which presents governments with a *grand-strategic* challenge: how to combine effectively soft and hard national means to obtain desired political outcomes. As we saw earlier, the problem of winning the peace, or the political objective of the war, is not equivalent to the problem of winning the war, because whereas the latter is a problem of strategy, the former is one of grand strategy. Thus, the realization of desired political outcomes, especially in the current international system, depends on the government’s ability to manage the complicated balances and tradeoffs that inhere in the relationship between force and diplomacy. Such, of course, has been the traditional and time-honored concern of statecraft; however, much less grand-strategic experience can be drawn on with respect to the newer forms of force and of communications, such as fighting terrorism in an age of global, real-time television and the Internet.

**Public Diplomacy and the Communications Environment**

An analysis of public diplomacy in current grand strategy—especially when focused on the effects of the new media—requires an appreciation of the constraints and

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\(^9\) Report of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the UN General Assembly (ESCWA 2001). A Freedom House (1999) survey shows that compared with 1950, when 31% of the global population was living in electoral democracies (meeting the standard of “universal suffrage for competitive multiparty elections”), 58.2% did so by the end of the 20th century. See also Rummel (2001:chapter 3).

\(^{10}\) As Bob (2000:296) observes, insurgent groups interested in attracting media attention to their struggles, increasingly “frame [them] in internationally resonant ‘categories and contexts’ as a means of gaining outside support.”

\(^{11}\) For example, President Bashar Assad of Syria recently told the congress of his Baath Party that the information revolution “made the society open,” creating “some confusion and suspicion in the minds of Arab youth” and threatening the Arab nation with “the destruction of Arab identity” (Assad: Media, tech crushing Arabs 2005). Alterman (2000) and Ghareeb (2000) provide evidence on the impact of changing communication technologies on the Middle East.
opportunities presented by the communications environment. Indeed, recent technological developments define a new, and constantly evolving, set of physical and social parameters for policy makers. They consist primarily of the following:

(a) Real-time, instantaneous reporting of events: Seib (2001:40) writes that “The theory in many newsrooms seems to be that if it’s happening now and we can get live pictures, then it’s newsworthy”—even if the featured events are devoid of long-term implications. The compression of time otherwise available for the journalistic and editorial process drives out context and complexity. The immediacy of live coverage also triggers cognitive frames and scripts that comprise (and thus maintain) dominant discourses (Karim 2002).

(b) Global reach of the media: Satellite broadcasting and the multiplicity of media outlets are now supplemented by the worldwide access of the Internet and by personal, mobile, digital multimedia devices. The immediacy and reach of the new media have resulted in the final collapse of time and space in the communications environment (Ammon 2001:6), and although vastly expanding potential target audiences, the diversity and interactivity of these media have at the same time “de-massified” them through decentralized, personalized “narrowcasting” (Deibert 1997:196–197).

(c) The pre-eminence of television as a preferred source of news: Given the medium’s nature, the consequence is that complex and contextual thinking on issues is subordinated to the image, the event, and the emotional drama.12 According to Taylor (1997:119), war—on television—is a “media war,” “literally a mediated event which draws on that reality but which, in and of itself, is confined merely to a third-party or an audio-visual—and thus a desensitizing—representation of it.”

Two second-tier consequences of these media characteristics are of importance for public diplomacy.13 First, as is expected with evolving technology, there is some debate as to its long-term impact, specifically whether it is integrative (e.g., Webster 1991:221) or centrifugal (e.g., Deibert 1997:196) with respect to creating a shared international culture. The nature of the trend, through its impact on the shape and boundaries of such a culture, may prove to be decisive in defining the future scope of soft power and public diplomacy: the broader the common normative basis, the more legitimacy can be gained (or lost) from policies enacted, in particular the use of hard power.

Second, and of greater short-run consequence for public diplomacy, is the transparency generated by the new media. This aspect of the communications environment, which Finel and Lord (2000:3) define as “a condition in which information about governmental preferences, intentions, and capabilities is made available either to the public or other outsiders,” has implications for both the likelihood and type of conflicts in which states engage; the conduct of diplomacy; the influence of domestic politics on international politics; and the overall power of states (Finel and Lord 2000:5–6). But in terms of integrating public diplomacy into grand strategy, the most important effect of transparency is the reduction—if not collapse—of the distance that separates the tactical level from the grand-strategic one. We return to this point below.

Defining the parameters of the communications environment does not in itself indicate how media influence is exerted on policy. This issue, in general terms, falls under the purview of the debate on the “CNN effect,” which argues that media coverage affects the policy process. Public diplomacy seeks to capitalize on this effect, namely to convey self-interested information through the new(s) media in the

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12 Strobel (1997:87) argues that real-time television reporting has forced newspapers to assume a more analytical style.

assumption that such media, by affecting foreign public opinion, are capable of exerting political influence on the respective target government. 14

A recent review by Gilboa (2005:37), critically noting the multiplicity and sometimes contradictory definitions of the CNN effect, points out that they include "‘forcing’ policy on leaders, ‘limiting’ their options, ‘disrupting’ their policy considerations, and ‘hindering’ implementation, as well as ‘enabling’ policy makers to adopt a policy and ‘helping’ implementation by ‘legitimizing’ actions and ‘manufacturing consent’." Indeed, the expected causal chain leading from media news coverage to public attitudes, and from there to government policy, could be short-circuited in several ways: the media may cover the news in conformity with dominant discourses and government frames, or be manipulated by some government officials to affect others (see Livingston and Eachus 1995:417),15 reversing the causal arrow of the CNN effect, as the "indexing" (Bennett 1990; Mermin 1999) and "manufacturing consent" (Herman and Chomsky 1988) hypotheses state; media may cover events so as to appeal to pre-existing public prejudices; the public may care too little about foreign policy issues to pressure government on existing policy; the government may deal with potential public dissatisfaction through censorship and propaganda; and so on. As often happens in social science research, then, broad generalizations of the CNN-effect type run into trouble and must be differentiated and contextualized further.

One way of doing so, suggested by Livingston’s (1997) "typology of policy-media effects," is to distinguish among different types of both CNN effects (agenda-setting agent, impediment, and accelerant) and foreign policy interventions. For instance, in peacekeeping operations, the most pronounced media effect is expected to be that of an impediment, as illustrated by the 1993 withdrawal of American troops from Somalia (Livingston’s 1997:7–10; Livingston and Eachus 1995). Another approach is Robinson’s (2002) policy–media interaction model, which seeks to specify the conditions under which media influence is likely (in cases of humanitarian intervention). Thus, when news media framing is critical of nonintervention and empathetic to the suffering of individuals, and when policy is uncertain (i.e., inconsistent, wavering, or nonexistent), then media coverage is influential and the CNN effect operates. At the other end of the continuum, where elite consensus can be found, the media is likely to be uncritical and supportive, and thus to assist the government in manufacturing consent (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Hutcheson et al. 2004:45–47). Indeed, Livingston and Bennett’s (2003) study of the effects of new media technologies on news coverage shows that although there has been an increase in event-driven (spontaneous and institutionally non-managed) foreign news on CNN between 1994 and 2001, these stories "overwhelmingly contain official voices" (p. 372).

Although public diplomacy as such was not the focus of attention in these studies, their findings, in conjunction with the characteristics of the communications environment, suggest several broad implications. First, the advent of live television, and even more so the Internet, enables the unmediated transmission of official messages to a potentially unlimited public (with niche Web audiences receiving personalized messages being a natural development). Second, even if the news is filtered and mediated, the findings of Livingston and Bennett (2003:375) attest to the persistent reliance of reporters on "official resources for news cues and frames." Third, whether official communications are mediated or not, the speed, transparency, and diversity of outlets favor a public diplomacy that is both proactive (i.e.,

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14 The CNN-effect debate, however, is broader than the scope of public diplomacy, as it is also applicable to domestic media effects operating on the propagandist’s foreign policy from within, namely through its own public opinion. Grand strategy should address both types of effects.

integrated into grand strategy) and attuned to the demands of a competitive field. And fourth, the kind of policy effect one wishes to produce via public diplomacy (assuming effective communication with the target foreign audience) is highly context dependent, with the possible exception of propaganda effects being neutralized by a consensual and resolute policy of the target foreign government.

Beyond these implications, the study of public diplomacy in the new media environment can benefit from context-specific analyses, as Livingston’s typology (if one transcends its exclusive focus on military interventions) offers to do for the CNN effect. Two considerations favor a grand-strategic perspective as providing a useful context. First, the effects that can be expected with public diplomacy depend on how it is implemented within grand strategy, especially its relationship with hard power. Second, when a government attempts to use media to manufacture, through foreign public opinion, certain desirable effects on a foreign government, it must often do so in the context of similar effects operating domestically on its own public opinion. The integrative nature of a grand-strategic perspective encompasses these aspects of public diplomacy. Thus, we turn now to a theoretical discussion of public diplomacy specifically in counterterrorist grand strategy, looking at the interplay between hard and soft power, and at the tradeoffs involved in managing CNN-effects at two levels—as these challenges are shaped by the communications environment.

The Media and Public Diplomacy in Counterterrorism

For governments that confront terrorism at home, the role of the media as an agenda-setter and accelerant should be far more pronounced than in intervention cases. The publication of gory details and graphic pictures that often follows terrorist attacks, in conjunction with (and in amplification of) the acute sense of individual insecurity generated by terrorism’s use of indiscriminate means against highly frequented civilian targets, are likely to increase public pressure for action on a government that may be reluctant to do so for grand-strategic reasons (e.g., not to spoil a peace process). Indeed, the catalytic power of terrorism is one of the reasons why it can become a strategic threat. The accelerant effect may also compel a government to act forcefully before it has fully reaped the propaganda dividends that sympathy for the victim yields: once the government applies force, its targets win media attention and the victimization discourse is overtaken by new images of suffering. Thus, the accelerant effect can become a policy impediment when grand strategy seeks to profit from a delicate balance between propaganda and the timing of military action.

Under different circumstances, these same CNN effects, as in intervention cases, can also be enabling. Media coverage of terrorist atrocities (and the more sensational, the better) may play into the hands of a government that is desperately seeking a pretext and public legitimation for military action. Domestic propaganda and public diplomacy gain immediately, galvanizing public opinion, and winning popular support for policies that may otherwise be opposed. Immediate retaliation risks the loss of some propaganda dividends, as noted above, but it is more acceptable (or less objectionable) when launched in the reactive context of “defense” or “punishment” than in the proactive context of “preemption” or “initiation.” From the “indexing” or “manufacturing consent” side of the government–media relationship, one should not forget that “counterterrorism relies upon media coverage as much as, if not more than, terrorism itself.” One role of the media is to delegitimize terrorism; another is to generate public support for counterterrorism (Crelinsten 2005:116). Still another domestic use of the media for the government

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16 Liebes and First (n.d.) make such an argument with respect to the October 12, 2000, Ramallah lynching of two Israeli soldiers by a Palestinian mob. The pictures of this event were quickly overtaken by footage of the Israeli retaliation against the Palestinian military headquarters in the city.
is to provide the public with “objective” proof that something is being done to combat terrorism.

The internal balancing of means in grand strategy is most complex when media effects are expected to impede policy implementation. In political rhetoric, counterterrorism can and often is portrayed as “war,” but the legitimacy that this framing is expected to confer on the wide-scale use of violence (as well as the domestic imposition of emergency measures) does not alter the fact that this type of war, by its very nature, implicates civilians as casualties of counterterrorist strikes. With global, real-time reporting, this means that pictures damaging to the government are instantly beamed to audiences around the world. Many continue to view the Vietnam War as the quintessential case for this kind of media influence on politics; however, even the buffers that existed then, when coverage was not live and editorial decisions intervened between events and their broadcasting, have since been all removed by technology. Given the strategic implications of certain graphic images (e.g., the October 1993 dragging of the dead American Ranger through the streets of Mogadishu or the February 1994 bombing of the Sarajevo market), decision makers feel compelled to control such media effects in some way.

Two such means, or strategies, have emerged historically as attempts to manage the interface between the military and the media in terms of its effect on public opinion. The first is media management, by which decision makers have tried to cope with the effects of public information flows on military operations—and vice versa. This includes access control (to the military arena itself), the provision of official information (through press releases, press conferences, interviews, etc.), the creation and management of media dependence on the military (for safety, transport, and communications), the imposition of censorship, and the use of the media for deception. (The Pentagon’s successful use of press pools in the 1991 Gulf War and embedded journalism in the recent Iraq War is often mentioned as exemplary media management.18) The second strategy, often circumventing the media as a mediator, is propaganda or public diplomacy, through which the government appeals directly to public opinion, whether at home or abroad. Live television (especially live press briefings) and the Internet allow the direct dissemination of strategically selected information without the mediation of journalistic processing.

However, the same media technologies that make global, real-time reporting possible—and now increasingly so from every location on the globe—also make effective media management a difficult proposition. As Livingston (2000:279) notes, “New communication technology means a ‘journalist’ is born every minute”—as evidenced most recently by the “citizen reporter” phenomenon in the London bombing attacks (“We had 50 images within an hour” 2005). Thus, although governments may continue to try and separate, through media management, the actual application of force in the field from its portrayal in the news media, attempting to do so increasingly runs the risk of credibility loss because of coverage by competing sources of information.

The depth of transparency made possible by the miniaturization and reach of technology has been such that the intervening space between grand strategy and tactics in the communications arena has collapsed. As the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force (2004) put it, “Transparency creates threats and opportunities—and changes in the strategy/tactics dynamic. Tactical events can instantly become strategic problems (digital cameras in Abu Ghraib).” Tactical events that have this capacity are usually those that are visually arresting and that can sym-

17 See Hiebert (1993:31) for a discussion of the public relations rules pertaining to information policy in crises.
18 For an interesting discussion of the British and Australian cases, see Hocking (1992).
19 The text continues: “On the other hand, transparency can show strategic threats more clearly and enhance the capacity to undercut an opponent’s political will and ability to mislead (embedded media in Iraq)” (p. 19).
bolize in one poignant image the suffering of ordinary people or the cruelty of those who inflict it. When the foreign media embeds such images within a dominant narrative or strategic framing that pits a powerful victimizer against a weak victim, it resonates strongly with foreign audiences and reverberates to their leaderships.\(^{20}\)

The projection of tactical events to the grand-strategic level is a force balancer for the weaker party, because the internationalization of the conflict invites diplomatic pressures on the stronger side and thereby produces political outcomes that otherwise evade the militarily inferior side (as Wolfsfeld 1997 claims was the effect of the media in the first Palestinian Intifada; see also Bob 2000).

This suggests a third strategy of coping with the constraints of the media environment, namely \textit{integrating}, rather than separating, (1) the use of force and (2) its expected propaganda or PR effects. In other words, at the grand-strategic level, coercive counterterrorist strategies are subject to \textit{political} considerations, and as public opinion is both essential to political outcomes and engaged by transparency, it follows that in grand-strategic thinking the military criteria for force application (“strategy” in the classical sense) must be reconciled with—at times even subordinated to—the expected propaganda effects (i.e., public diplomacy) of such an operation.\(^{21}\) If the implication of contemporary transparency is that governments can no longer control the visibility of (strategically significant) small-scale events, then it is the events themselves that governments will try to shape. In practice, this means incorporating the tactical level of strategy into grand-strategic planning.\(^{22}\)

Thus, whereas on a military-strategic basis alone (i.e., to achieve military decision) the application of all-out force could be deemed necessary, on the grand-strategic level—where the political objective of the war is the criterion—such use of force may be considered detrimental. Such, for example, was the calculation that guided the Coalition bombing of Baghdad during the Gulf War (Taylor 1997). Although “smart” bombs constituted only 8% of all bombs dropped on Iraq, such exclusively were the weapons used over the Iraqi capital. In this case, military tactics and propaganda went hand in hand: precision bombing supported the claim that the war was directed against the regime, not against the Iraqi people. The close integration between military means and PR objectives was also evident in the equipping of PGMs with video-cameras, designed to convey an ability to hit military targets accurately yet distinguish them from civilian ones (Taylor 1997:134). Likewise, in the summer of 2002, in the aftermath of Operation Defensive Shield (see next section), then deputy chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), Major General Moshe Ya’alon, acknowledged that decisions on the deployment of a tank, which might “photograph badly” on CNN, or the use of combat helicopters in daylight, could be affected by the on-site presence of press cameras (Israel Democracy Institute 2002: 58–59).

Yet, hard power and soft power requirements may be difficult to reconcile, and in some contexts, as Nye (2004:9) notes, tradeoffs cannot be avoided. For example, Nevo and Shur (2002:11), who argue that the IDF is disadvantaged to begin with by the “David versus Goliath” narrative that frames foreign public opinion on the conflict, point to an inherent tension between force and public diplomacy in counterterrorist operations: “In order to deter, the IDF has to appear and operate like a

\(^{20}\) In the second Intifada, the shooting death of the Palestinian boy Muhammad a-Dura on October 1, 2000, is analyzed in these terms by Liebes and First (n.d.).

\(^{21}\) Strategy and propaganda were of course related at the grand-strategic level before the age of transparency. An interesting case where this relationship was not properly addressed and all national means were subordinated to the strategic goal of achieving victory is the Schlieffen plan: it made the invasion of Belgium a necessary component of German military strategy, but thereby practically guaranteed that the violation of Belgian neutrality would rally British public opinion to the defense of “brave little Belgium” (Roetter 1974:30–31).

\(^{22}\) If such adaptation is widely acknowledged to be the practice, strategic implications will be \textit{inferred} from tactical action, and tactical-level confrontations—especially those that provide good footage—will be waged as strategic conflicts.
Goliath. Yet, every time it appears and operates like a Goliath, it instantly loses media points.23

Media-imposed transparency has the additional policy consequence of blurring the distinction between domestic propaganda and public diplomacy. Both are components of grand strategy, but they have contradictory relationships with the military component. Thus, whereas the government, following a terrorist attack, may find it rational for public diplomacy reasons to practice restraint and defer retaliation, or to react mildly while abstaining from harming civilians, domestic morale (ever so important in protracted conflict) and frustration may require that some action—possibly forceful retaliation—be taken nevertheless.24 Thus, media effects that act as an accelerant at the domestic level may become media effects that act as an agenda-setter at the international level, which is often precisely what the terrorists are after. It is the role of grand strategy to manage these tradeoffs in the service of national goals.25

We now turn to an empirical examination of the issues raised in this section. This is done by reviewing the Israeli experience in the second Intifada, where the challenge for the government was to integrate its military response to the Palestinian uprising and suicide bombings with the propaganda requirements of justifying its actions abroad. The ensuing events—in particular, the decision to enter the Jenin refugee camp during Operation Defensive Shield—revealed some of the complex tradeoffs that the new communications environment poses for public diplomacy and grand strategy.26

Israel in Operation Defensive Shield: a Case Study

On March 27, 2002, well into the second Palestinian Intifada ("uprising"), a Hamas suicide bombing at the Park Hotel in the Israeli coastal city of Netanya claimed the lives of 30 civilians and injured another 140 while they were celebrating the Passover holiday seder. In response, the Israeli government authorized Operation Defensive Shield, which was launched on March 29 and lasted until April 21. During the military operation, three flashpoints stood at the center of media attention: the "Mukata'a," the Ramallah compound of Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Yassir Arafat, which the IDF entered on March 29; the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem, which, along with hostages, was taken over by Palestinian gunmen on April 4 and subsequently subjected to an IDF siege that lasted until May 10; and the Jenin refugee camp, which the IDF entered in pursuit of terrorists on April 3 and that became the site of a fierce battle and an alleged massacre. At the height of the operation (by April 3), Israel reoccupied six of the largest cities in the West Bank.

The decision on the extensive application of military force in an already highly visible conflict presented the Israeli government with several grand-strategic challenges involving public diplomacy. A thorough analysis of this case is beyond the scope of this paper.27 This section is therefore limited to a brief review of empirical

23 My translation from the Hebrew source.
24 A related problem is the tradeoff between domestic and enemy morale, so well exemplified by the debate in WWII over the Morgenthau plan and the policy of "unconditional surrender": while the policy boosted domestic morale, it also stiffened the enemy’s determination to resist. See Daugherty (1958) and Taylor (1997:161–162).
25 "Low-signature" operations, whose covertness and speed evade real-time detection by the press, are an attempt to partially escape this predicament (see Wolfsfeld 2003:2; Catignani 2005:66).
26 The objective of the case study is not to test a well-defined theory; it is, rather, to enrich the empirical basis on which such a theory can draw. This should allay concerns about its representativeness, which is sometimes an issue when the Israeli experience is used for theory validation. Neither is the Israeli case, in its broad contours, unique: managing public diplomacy and force in counterterrorist grand strategy, and doing so in a media-saturated environment, is a challenge confronting other governments as well. One should also point out that the ethical dimensions of Israeli grand strategy, its effectiveness, or its improvement—although impossible completely to ignore and in themselves worthy of a full-fledged investigation—are not the objective of the current analysis.
27 See Mor (2003) for such an analysis, on which this and the following sections draw.
findings and observations on three issues that pertain to our earlier discussion: the nature of the operation’s objectives; the organizational basis of public diplomacy; and the actions taken in the Jenin refugee camp.

Objectives—Real and Professed

The Cabinet communique, published on March 29, stated that the goal of Operation Defensive Shield was “to defeat the infrastructure of Palestinian terror in all its parts and components.” The statement also labeled Arafat an enemy “who set up a coalition of terror against Israel,” and declared he was targeted for isolation. In the following days, public statements by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (Likud) tied Arafat to terrorism more explicitly, but the prime minister stopped short of accusing the PA itself of being a terrorist organization and gave no indication that the purpose of the operation was to dismantle it. Neither was such a goal mentioned in Sharon’s April 8 speech to the Knesset, where he declared that the military operation was designed to destroy the Arafat-built infrastructure of terrorism. The limited and focused nature of the operation was also emphasized by Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer (Labor) and by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres (Labor) who, in an interview on CNN Live Today, stated that “We are not there [in the West Bank] to dismantle the PA” and neither is there an intention to expel Arafat. Statements by lower-level officials were less restrained, however, going as far as accusing Arafat of directing the terrorist campaign and the PA of embracing the killing as a goal.

Comments by Israeli journalists at the time, as well as a subsequent study by Dor (2003), pointed to the disturbing discrepancy between, on the one hand, the nature and extent of the responsibility that the Israeli government was publicly attributing to the PA and, on the other, the actual operational plans of the IDF: if the PA was cultivating a terrorist infrastructure, and if the destruction of that infrastructure was the declared military objective of Operation Defensive Shield, did this imply that Israeli officials were simply reluctant to admit publicly that undermining or overthrowing the PA itself was the actual goal of the operation?

Indeed, some of the military actions taken by the IDF could not be easily reconciled with the public agenda of the operation. Thus, the targeting of the Bituniya headquarters of the Palestinian Preventive Security Forces, headed by Jibril Rajoub, seemed at odds with the latter’s record as Israel’s most active and trusted partner in coordinating security matters. Israeli journalist Danny Rubinstein of Ha’aretz concluded that the operation against Rajoub’s headquarters, despite official allegations that some terrorists had found refuge there, betrayed the real nature of the government’s goal, namely the “complete destruction of the Palestinian security system—to return to Israeli hands the full security control of the West Bank.”

28 “Cabinet Communiqué,” Jerusalem, March 29, 2002. A large collection of documents related to Operation Defensive Shield can be found in the archives of the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003). Unless otherwise noted, this is the source of the documents cited in this section.
29 “PM Sharon’s Address to the Nation,” Jerusalem, March 31, 2002.
30 “PM Sharon’s Address to the Knesset,” Jerusalem, April 8, 2002.
32 “Interview with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on CNN,” April 1, 2002.
33 Dor (2003) provides an extensive discussion of this issue and a multitude of citations from the Israeli press on which this section relies in part.
34 See, for example, Schiff (March 31, 2002) and Kaspit (April 2, 2002).
35 Dor (2003) provides an extensive discussion of this issue and a multitude of citations from the Israeli press on which this section relies in part.
36 See Rubinstein (April 7, 2002); my translation from the Hebrew source in this and in all subsequent citations from the Israeli press.
Likewise, a senior commentator on Israel Television-Channel One, Amnon Avramovitch, pointed to the fact that a significant portion of the operation was focused on the PA, despite the fact that other organizations—the Islamic Jihad and the Hamas—were responsible for most of the terrorist attacks (cited in Dor 2003:69–70).

The ambiguity of goals and their incoherence with some of the military initiatives had their roots, first, in Sharon’s earlier failure to win approval for a resolution in the Cabinet calling for the dismantling of the PA and for Arafat’s expulsion. This plan was rejected by Peres and Ben Eliezer, the senior members of the Labor coalition partner that Sharon did not want to lose; moreover, the defense establishment expressed concern that Arafat in exile would be even more dangerous, as would the likely destabilizing repercussions in Egypt and Jordan (Schiffer March 31, 2002). A second reason was the difficulty of reconciling the dismantling of the PA with American regional interests in securing a cease-fire and renewing negotiations—objectives presupposing the continuing viability of the Palestinian leadership and its institutions. Thus, at the level of grand strategy, Israel’s desire to maintain American support constrained its public diplomacy to messages that focused on the consensual struggle against terrorism.

The resulting confusion at the grand-strategic level reverberated down its military levels. The IDF General Staff was concerned about the precise objectives of the military campaign and its expected duration, and senior officers were “worried about the undeclared intentions of the prime minister.” The exclusion of Gaza and the surrounding refugee camps, where the hard-core leadership of Palestinian terrorism was thought to be based, was also a source of puzzlement (Leshem April 5, 2002). The failure to define the precise political context in which the military operation was supposed to unfold undermined the harmony between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of strategy. As we shall see, in the absence of a clear awareness of political objectives, the logic of military action prevailed over all other considerations. As it filtered down to the lowest ranks, it generated tactical-level events that, when amplified by the media, were propelled back up to the grand-strategic level—with dire consequences.

**Organizing for Public Diplomacy**

During Operation Defensive Shield, Foreign Minister Peres told NBC: “We don't want to win a war. We want to gain a peace [. . .] If we wanted to win a war, we would have employed our army totally in a different manner.” In the spirit of Liddell Hart, this statement indicates a political perspective on the use of force and, one may presume, an awareness of its propaganda implications. Indeed, by the time the military operation was launched, the Israeli foreign and defense establishments had become much more attuned than in the past to the importance of public diplomacy in grand strategy.

Still, when the State Comptroller conducted an in-depth review of national propaganda in the months of August 2001 to January 2002 (a year into the second Intifada), the persistently recurrent pathologies of Israeli “hasbara” (public diplomacy) resurfaced: There was no overarching, integrative, and comprehensive conception of public diplomacy, and there was no agreed-upon body (with regular representation in the Cabinet) that could oversee, coordinate, and guide its conduct; issues related to the division of labor and responsibility—especially in the sensitive area of handling the foreign press—were not clearly defined and resolved; and Arab propaganda was not labeled a strategic threat and thus was not the

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57 Interview with Tim Russert on “NBC Meet the Press,” April 21, 2002.
58 For full details, see Mor (2003).
focus of intelligence collection and evaluation. In a subsequent testimony before the Knesset State Control Committee, the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, Avi Gil, attributed the organizational pathologies to the “latifundian” structure of the Israeli political system, which resists efforts to centralize authority at the top.

In a communications environment in which the media disseminates messages so quickly and widely that careful editing (let alone retraction) is often impossible, the existence of political latifundia that evade control adds an additional layer of obstacles in the way of an integrative, fine-tuned public diplomacy. But if the centralized, proactive—let alone reactive—construction of a public diplomacy campaign is a difficult challenge for any democracy, the reactive imposition of censorship requires but a single authoritative decision. Thus, against the recommendations of the IDF and despite the objections of its Spokesperson’s Division, the minister of defense (in an outraged reaction to a previous airing on Israeli television of a report criticizing IDF operations in the West Bank) issued an unambiguous directive that prohibited the media from entering the combat areas (Kitrey 2003). One consequence was the widespread accusation—to which Israel could only offer its protest—that the IDF was trying to hide its actions from the world; another (ironic) consequence was the absence of the restraining impact of the foreign media, especially in the Jenin refugee camp, to which we turn next.

The Jenin Operation

The event that attracted media attention most of all—and that exacted the highest political costs abroad—was the IDF incursion into the Jenin refugee camp, where some of the militants most wanted by Israel for terrorist activities were entrenched. During its initial stages, the military operation appeared to have been subject to non-military constraints—that is, to considerations of image management that spelled restraint in the use of force—as grand-strategic thinking would require. However, the situation changed when IDF calls for surrender did not elicit the desired response and the troops encountered fierce resistance instead. A turning point came on April 9, when 13 soldiers were ambushed and killed by Palestinian gunmen inside the camp. This setback seems to have changed priorities in the IDF, at least for the commanding officers of the Jenin operation. The decision at the tactical level to introduce the so-called “D-niners”—bulldozer operators—and entrust them with razing to the ground every house from which fire was aimed at the troops, was taken in order to reduce IDF casualties. The result was described by Ha’aretz correspondent Amos Harel:

IDF officers expressed yesterday shock with regards to the conduct of the operation in Jenin. According to them, “because of the risks, the soldiers almost do not advance on foot. The bulldozers simply “shave” the houses and cause horrendous damage to them. When the world sees pictures of what we’ve done there, it will be tremendously damaging for us. The Palestinians are conducting

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40 State Control Committee (2002).
41 For an excellent (comparative) discussion of existing coordination problems in British public diplomacy, see Leonard, Stead, and Smewing (2002: chapters 4, 7).
42 See also Limor (April 9, 2002), who reports a different reason for banning the press—the minister of defense’s concern, based on previous experience, that openness would be exploited to broadcast pictures that would be damaging to the IDF and to Israel.
43 One can easily slip into cynicism and assume that all restraints derived from PR calculations and none was a product of humanitarian concerns. Motivations are difficult to untangle here, but Ron Ben Yishai, the military commentator of Israel Television-Channel One, seems to have expressed Israeli self-perception best when he attributed the high number of IDF casualties to self-restraint for fear of harming civilians in the camp. He then added: “I saw how the Russians did it in Grozny. They just flattened a city of 40,000 people. The IDF does not do it, and that is why it sustains losses” (cited in Dor 2003:67).
In the aftermath of the Jenin incursion, Israel found itself under a criticism blitz, which included accusations of a massacre. In public diplomacy terms, this outcome could only be considered a failure, given that Israel wanted to convey the impression that it was acting in self-defense as a victim of terrorism. In the end, the Israelis did have to defend themselves—against the foreign media, which occupied itself not with the suicide bombing attacks of Palestinian terrorists but with Israel’s violence against Palestinian civilians. In May 2002, a report of Human Rights Watch (2002) absolved the IDF of the massacre accusations; so did the report of the UN Secretary General in August. However, both of these sources charged the IDF with serious human rights violations. Israel may have won the “war” in Jenin, but in terms of the political consequences—especially world public opinion—it “lost the peace”: what remained in the aftermath of the incursion was an image of the wasteland that had once been home to so many families; an impression of IDF brutality and callousness; and a diminished sympathy for Israel’s own plight.

Case Analysis and Conclusions

Because of the current normative structure of international politics and the transparency generated by the communications environment, military imbalances are often offset by propaganda imbalances, with net effects operating at the grand-strategic level. Thus, at that level, Israeli occupation and military dominance are counteracted by a “David versus Goliath” narrative that favors the Palestinians in PR terms (Nevo and Shur 2002:10), and serves as the natural and basic framework within which quickly evolving events are interpreted by the foreign press. This tendency is reinforced by real-time and image-governed television, which drives out context and complexity and, under the pressure of live coverage, promotes reliance on simple and ready narratives. One implication for the grand strategist is that alternative framing, if it is to inform live coverage in crisis situations, must be cultivated on an ongoing basis and not just as a matter of crisis management and damage control. But it is also tempting to conclude (as some Israelis have done) that structural imbalances in the propaganda arena undermine the utility of this instrument and diminish its role in grand strategy.45 The analysis of the case indicates, however, that process is associated with much variability in outcomes, and that public diplomacy is an essential component, and increasingly so, of grand strategy.

The Jenin chapter of Operation Defensive Shield, in particular, highlights several important aspects of the relationship between propaganda and military operations—and the tradeoffs they bring to the grand-strategic level. To start with, a derivate strategy of the communications environment is media management to control information flow, as argued above. In the Israeli case, where this was attempted by means of access denial, the decision backfired, because it started a series of rumors that the Israelis could not control or cope with, having cut themselves off from objective sources of corroboration (in contrast to the system of embedded journalism that the U.S. military adopted in the recent Iraq War). When the Palestinians charged the IDF with having committed a massacre in Jenin, the Israelis went on the defensive, but were at a loss to explain why the media could not see for

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44 The UN Secretary-General’s report on Jenin (UN 2002), states that “[f]ollowing the ambush, IDF appeared to have shifted tactics from house-to-house searches and destruction of the homes of known militants to wider bombardment with tanks and missiles. IDF also used armored bulldozers, supported by tanks, to demolish portions of the camp.” The bulldozers may have been introduced earlier, as the SG report suggests elsewhere. However, for the purpose of this discussion, the decision itself to use the bulldozers remains the most important aspect.

themselves and why international humanitarian agencies could not enter the camp. Another consequence of the decision was the removal of the restraints that the on-site presence of the media would have forced the troops to adopt. Indeed, detached from the media, the military logic of the action—achieving decision at all costs—began to prevail, as time pressure, unyielding resistance, and rising casualties invited escalation in means and pushed aside whatever grand-strategic repercussions the local commanders were attuned to. Liddell Hart wrote that “the perfection of strategy would be to produce a decision without any serious fighting” (1967:338), but within the Jenin microcosm, and from the perspective of the local commanders, the use of armored bulldozers to flatten house after house was in many ways the end of strategy, as brute force became the means of achieving military decision. Although the tactic paid off in terms of minimizing casualties (indeed, there were no additional Israeli fatalities after April 9), its other effect was to create the most horrendous scenes of destruction, which produced dramatic photos and haunted Israeli public diplomacy for a long time thereafter.

Thus, the analysis of the Jenin case shows that tactical effects, propelled and amplified by the reach and image-centered nature of the global news media, quickly rose to the level of grand strategy, where they were implanted in the fertile soil of the international normative agenda. The lesson is clear: in contrast to the deceptive impression that “levels of military strategy” schemes may convey, the new communications environment so compresses the space in the “architecture” of strategy—to apply Luttwak’s (2001:209) “multilevel edifice” image—that tactical effects are never far from the surface of grand strategy.

If this is the case, and if, as Liddell Hart (1967:339) has noted, it is the responsibility of the government “to decide whether strategy should make its contribution by achieving a military decision or otherwise,” then the question is whether Israeli policy makers should not have rescued the operation from its dependence on strict military logic. If, in the new media environment, the tactics-grand strategy space is compressed, it is incumbent upon public diplomacy to exert some control over tactics. The case study suggests two minimal conditions for doing so: (a) a coherent conception of political goals that is clearly communicated all the way down to the tactical level, and (b) an organizational structure that centralizes, directs, and monitors ongoing public diplomacy. As the empirical analysis has shown, neither of these requirements was met by Israeli grand strategy during Operation Defensive Shield.

From an operational perspective, the question just posed boils down to the following: was the victory that the IDF persistently pursued at the military level worth the diplomatic and political costs that Israel incurred? Did the IDF have to enter the camp? The analysis conducted in this paper cannot resolve this issue, nor was it designed to do so. Instead, the objective was to use the case to extract some insights into the relationship between force (or strategy) and media effects (or public diplomacy)—from the perspective of grand strategy. From this vantage point, it is useful to point out that the questions raised above were implicitly suggested.

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46 In pondering this issue, it is useful to keep in mind how different the military-strategic logic can be from the grand-strategic one, as exemplified in Luttwak’s (1988:167) observation that “if you steal fifty dollars from a Mafia family, it will cheerfully spend half a million dollars to find you.”

47 As to the effectiveness of the military operation, it is interesting that the official website of the IDF Spokesperson (Israel Defense Forces 2005), in an effort to demonstrate an enhanced capability at thwarting terrorist attacks, provides figures that simultaneously convey a much greater number of terrorist attempts in the period following Operation Defensive Shield. For example, the number of suicide attacks (thwarted or perpetrated) reported by this site was 54 in 2001, 167 in 2002, 209 in 2003, and 130 in 2004. At the same time, the annual number of Israelis killed in suicide attacks has declined since 2002 and, as noted, a growing percentage of such attacks has been thwarted. Even if replicated by other sources, these figures defy an easy causal interpretation, given validity issues (e.g., history) with time-series designs and ill-defined time horizons where grand-strategic assessments are concerned.
implicated in a related case—that of the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem—which ended very differently. The Palestinian gunmen who stormed the church and held its staff hostage were no less an enemy of the IDF, and yet the entire crisis (not battle!) was handled with its non-military implications constantly in mind. Had the church been a plain building in the Jenin refugee camp, the refusal to surrender would have most likely brought in the bulldozers. But in Bethlehem, neither negotiations nor compromise was considered an unacceptable outcome: among the 124 Palestinians whom the IDF allowed to leave after a 5-week siege were 13 whom the Israelis considered to be “senior terrorists,” and who were flown through Cyprus to their exile in several EU countries (Church of Nativity undamaged after standoff 2002). Whereas the situation in Bethlehem had a religious saliency that made the tactics–grand strategy relationship (and its potentially explosive implications) too concretely evident to be overlooked or ignored, such was not the case in Jenin, where tactical thinking and the pressures of evolving circumstances quickly prevailed.

As noted, this outcome came about partly as a result of goal ambiguity and poor coordination. But at a deeper level, it was a consequence of the “militarization of security,” fostered in the Israeli case by the unrivaled influence of the defense establishment in national security decision making (Ben-Meir 1987; Handel 1994). What this outlook does is “strategize” diplomacy, in the sense of subjecting it to the logic of the strategist, instead of subjecting force to grand strategy. The latter alternative, as this study has argued theoretically and as the case demonstrates, is an adaptive response to a media-saturated environment and to the diffusion of democratic norms.

Additional, comparative research is required to establish whether and how grand-strategic thinking mediates the relationship between hard and soft power in current security thinking. In particular, this needs to be done for the application of soft power in competitive conditions, namely in the context of propaganda wars, which requires more attention to the interactive level than given here. However, what cuts across all research that deals with propaganda is an apprehension about its long-term normative implications, especially if the role of public diplomacy in grand strategy continues to grow. Without slighting these concerns, it would be appropriate, in conclusion, to draw attention to the possibility that increased reliance on public diplomacy could have positive repercussions as well. In the short run, the realization that military tactics quickly rise to the level of grand strategy, where they can offset the political gains of force, will probably lead to subjecting military means to PR constraints, so that the metaphorical meaning of “what shoots well” may override its literal meaning. In the long run, however, practice makes norms, so that a repeated and widespread restraining of violence that begins with instrumental considerations in mind could ultimately affect conceptions of identity and interests. A factor that reinforces this process is the declining ability to use propaganda for deception, namely to acquire influence by manufacturing false impressions of respect for human rights: given the transparency of the new communications environment and the importance of credibility for effective self-presentation, action cannot deviate too far from rhetoric. In this (perhaps ironic) sense, the greater role of public diplomacy in the grand strategies of states may inadvertently assist in the definition and institutionalization of international norms on the use of force.

48 Mendel (1993) discusses this issue in connection with the dominance of “strategic thinking” during the Cold War.
49 The “newly discovered” logic of grand strategy—adjusted to the information revolution under the label “effects-based operations” (EBO)—is increasingly affecting American defense discourse (see Davis 2001). This concept, although system oriented, is still war bound.
50 Thussu’s (2002) study of India in the 1999 Kargil War, although not conducted from an explicitly grand-strategic perspective, is a good example.
References


