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Bandwagoning for Profit

Randall L. Schweller

Bringing the Revisionist State Back In

Do states ally more often with the weaker or with the stronger side in a conflict? In the parlance of international relations theory: do states tend to balance against or bandwagon with a rising state or coalition? The answer to this question is critical to the formulation of grand strategy and the definition of vital interests. If states resist the gains of their neighbors by drawing together to redress the balance, then conquest does not pay¹ and interventions to defend far-flung commitments are not only unnecessary, but often counterproductive in causing local states to unite against the meddling great power and its protégé. Conversely, if states gravitate to expanding power, then bandwagons will roll, dominoes will fall, and great powers will find it wise, even at the cost of blood and treasure, to defend remote areas of little or no intrinsic value to their national interests.²

While international relations scholars have traditionally accepted the view that states balance against threatening increases of power, paradoxically, practitioners through the ages have held a bandwagoning image of international politics. As Jack Snyder remarks, "most imperial strategists defending far-flung commitments have feared falling dominoes, and most rising chal-

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1. A leading proponent of the "balancing predominates" view, Kenneth N. Waltz, remarks: "In international politics, success leads to failure. The excessive accumulation of power by one state or coalition of states elicits the opposition of others." Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 49.

2. The bandwagoning image of international politics pictures the global order as a complex machine of wheels within wheels. In this highly interconnected world, small local disruptions quickly grow into large disturbances as their effects cascade and reverberate throughout the system. In contrast, the balancing image sees a world composed of many discrete, self-regulating balance-of-power systems. Because balancing is the prevailing tendency among states, prudent powers should limit their commitments to places where their core interests are at stake.

lengers have anticipated bandwagon effects.”³ Dean Acheson, for example, expressed the bandwagoning image that underlay American containment strategy, warning the U.S. cabinet in 1947 that, “if Greece fell within the Russian orbit, not only Turkey would be affected but also Italy, France, and the whole of Western Europe.”⁴ Similarly, in 1635, the count-duke of Olivares predicted that, in the coming war with France, small losses for Spain would lead to more far-ranging ones: “The first and most fundamental dangers threaten Milan, Flanders and Germany. Any blow against these would be fatal to this monarchy; and if any one of them were to go, the rest of the monarchy would follow, for Germany would be followed by Italy and Flanders, Flanders by the Indies, and Milan by Naples and Sicily.”⁵

The bandwagoning belief that “nothing succeeds like success” in war has been at the heart of every bid for world mastery. Napoleon asserted: “My power depends on my glory and my glories on the victories I have won. My power will fail if I do not feed it on new glories and new victories. Conquest has made me what I am, and only conquest can enable me to hold my position.”⁶ Likewise, Hitler declared: “We shall yet have to engage in many fights, but these will undoubtedly lead to magnificent victories. Thereafter the way to world domination is practically certain.”⁷

3. Jack Snyder, “Introduction,” to Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 3.

4. Quoted in Deborah Welch Larson, “Bandwagoning Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?” in *ibid.*, p. 95.

5. Quoted in J.H. Elliott, “Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain,” in Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 97.

6. Quoted in Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 133. Napoleon often spoke in terms of bandwagoning dynamics. In 1794, he said: “It is necessary to overwhelm Germany; that done, Spain and Italy fall of themselves”; in 1797: “Let us concentrate all our activity on the side of the navy, and destroy England; this done, Europe is at our feet”; and in 1811, “In five years, I shall be the master of the world; there only remains Russia, but I shall crush it.” Quoted in R.B. Mowat, *The Diplomacy of Napoleon* (New York: Russell & Russell, [1924] 1971), pp. 22, 53, 243. Not all French strategists of the period viewed the world in these terms, however. After his remarkable victory over the First Coalition in 1794, Carnot feared that France might become drunk with victory: “The rapidity of our military successes . . . do not permit us to doubt that we could . . . reunite to France all the ancient territory of the Gauls. But however seductive this system may be, it will be found perhaps that it is wise to renounce it, and that France would only enfeeble herself and prepare an interminable war by aggrandizement of this kind.” Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 11.

7. Adolf Hitler in a speech to Gauleiters on May 8, 1943. Quoted in J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., *Nazism, 1919–1945: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts*, Vol. II: *Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination* (New York: Schocken Books, 1988), p. 857.

Recently, the issue of how states choose sides in a conflict has sparked a rich and somewhat heated theoretical debate. The view that “balancing predominates” has been most forcefully articulated by Stephen Walt.⁸ Offering balance-of-threat theory to explain the causes of alignment, Walt claims that under most conditions balancing is far more common than bandwagoning. Some of his critics, however, point to numerous historical examples of bandwagoning and claim that balancing is the exception, not the rule.⁹ Others argue that Walt’s theory downplays the importance of domestic factors in alliance decisions. They suggest that illegitimate elites and states that are weak *vis-à-vis* their societies bandwagon more often than balance-of-threat theory predicts.¹⁰

In this article, I argue that all sides in the debate have mistakenly assumed that bandwagoning and balancing are opposite behaviors motivated by the same goal: to achieve greater security. As a result, the concept of bandwagoning has been defined too narrowly—as giving in to threats—as if it were simply the opposite of balancing. In practice, however, states have very different reasons to choose balancing or bandwagoning. The aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted. Simply put, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain.¹¹ The presence of a significant external threat, while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to bandwagon.

8. For his most comprehensive statement on the subject, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

9. See Robert G. Kaufman, “To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 417–447; and Paul W. Schroeder, “Neo-Realist Theory and International History: An Historian’s View,” paper presented at the War and Peace Institute, Columbia University, June 11, 1993.

10. The domestic-sources school of alliance formation includes Deborah Welch Larson, Stephen R. David, and Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett. See Larson, “Bandwagoning Images in American Foreign Policy,” pp. 85–111; Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233–256; David, “Why the Third World Still Matters,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 127–159; David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); and Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, “Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security,” *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 19–40; Levy and Barnett, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–1973,” *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 369–395.

11. As will be discussed, when its purpose is profit and not security, bandwagoning is the opposite of defensive buck-passing, not of balancing. We might call this type of bandwagoning “predatory buck-passing”: riding free on the *offensive* efforts of others to gain unearned spoils.

I adopt a different definition of bandwagoning—one that accords with common usage of the term—and argue that it is far more widespread than Walt suggests. To see this, however, we must focus on two factors that have been overlooked: the opportunistic aspect of bandwagoning, and the alliance choices of states that pose threats as well as those of states that respond to threats. In short, the theoretical literature on alliances must bring the revisionist state back in.

The article begins by outlining the various positions in the “balancing versus bandwagoning” debate. In the next section, I offer a different critique of balance-of-threat theory that centers on Walt’s definition of bandwagoning and the limitations of his theory as an explanation of alliances. This is followed by a discussion of rewards and bandwagoning, which underscores the opportunistic aspect of bandwagoning that has gone overlooked. Next, I examine the various reasons why states bandwagon other than as a form of appeasement. Finally, I propose an alternative theory of alliances based on the political goals of states.

Balance-of-Threat Theory and Its Critics

In *The Origins of Alliances* and several other works,¹² Stephen Walt offers a refinement of balance-of-power theory, called balance-of-threat theory. Like structural balance-of-power theorists, Walt concludes that states usually balance and rarely bandwagon; unlike them, however, he argues that states do not align solely or even primarily in response to the distribution of capabilities. States’ alliance choices are driven instead, Walt argues, by imbalances of threat, when one state or coalition is especially dangerous.¹³ The level of threat that a state poses to others is the product of its aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and the perceived aggressiveness of its intentions.

12. See Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 3–43; Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,” *International Organization*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 275–316; Walt, “The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5–49; Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition,” in Jervis and Snyder, *Dominoes and Bandwagons*, pp. 51–84; Walt, “Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Laps,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 448–482.

13. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 265; Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia,” p. 54.

Walt claims that his theory “improves on traditional balance of power theory by providing greater explanatory power with equal parsimony.”¹⁴ Because aggregate power is only one of several components defining a threat, Walt’s theory explains, *inter alia*, the formation of overlarge winning coalitions in World Wars I and II, and “alliance choices when a state’s potential allies are roughly equal in power. In such circumstances, a state will ally with the side it believes is least dangerous.”¹⁵

Walt’s theory is an impressive and convincing amendment of traditional balance-of-power theory. Walt builds on existing theory in a critical and constructive way, and he presents a clear and compelling set of ideas backed by a comprehensive survey of alliance formation in several regional universes of cases. While the evidence appears to support Walt’s central claims, however, his theory has not been without its critics.

THE CHALLENGERS: THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF ALLIANCES

Robert Kaufman argues that democracies do not behave as balance-of-threat theory predicts because various domestic constraints imposed by the democratic process delay balancing behavior and dilute its effectiveness.¹⁶ As evidence, Kaufman points to the appeasement policies and the slow pace of balancing by the Western democracies in response to Hitler, who, he asserts, “gave ample warning that he would lead a powerful, extremely dissatisfied Germany . . . down a path . . . that made conflict with other states inevitable.” Given the clear danger presented by Nazi Germany, Europe during the 1930s is an “easy case” for Walt’s theory; yet, Kaufman claims, it fails the test.¹⁷

Deborah Larson’s central charge against Walt’s theory is that it cannot explain why similarly situated states behave in opposite ways and contrary to the theory’s predictions, i.e., why strong states sometimes bandwagon

14. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 263.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 264. This is a somewhat curious claim, however, since balance-of-power theory already has a commonly known phrase for this situation, called “holding the balance.” When a state occupies this enviable position, it can play the role of balancer or that of kingmaker. As balancer, it seeks to preserve a stalemate between the two rivals. As kingmaker, it sells its services to the highest bidder. The motto of the kingmaker is: “*Cui adhaereo prae est*,” translated as “the one that I join is the one which will turn the scales” or “the party to which I adhere getteth the upper hand.” See Herbert Butterfield, “The Balance of Power,” p. 138; and Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power,” p. 159; both in Butterfield and Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

16. Kaufman, “To Balance or to Bandwagon?” pp. 423, 436, 438.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 419–420.

and weak states sometimes balance.¹⁸ To explain these empirical anomalies, Larson offers an institutionalist approach that measures state strength by the nature of its state-society relations.¹⁹ Positing that elites' primary concern is to preserve their rule, Larson concludes that bandwagoning can help a weak regime retain authority by ending external subversion, undermining domestic rivals, and providing economic assistance and "an aura of invincibility by association with the great power's victories."²⁰

Steven David argues that realism's state-centric perspective ignores the "often fatal nature of the international and *domestic* political environment that characterizes the Third World."²¹ To explain Third World alliances, David introduces the concept of omnibalancing, so-called because it "incorporates the need of leaders to appease secondary adversaries, as well as to balance against both internal and external threats in order to survive in power."²² Like Larson, David suggests that fragile Third World elites often bandwagon with hostile powers to balance more dangerous domestic or foreign threats.²³

Similarly, Jack Levy and Michael Barnett maintain that realism is "relatively silent concerning Third World alliances in general or how state-society relations in particular might give rise to distinctive patterns of alignment behavior."²⁴ Stressing the resource-providing function of alliances and the impact of the domestic political economy on Third World alignments,²⁵ they conclude that Third World leaders form alliances "to secure urgently needed economic and military resources to promote domestic goals, respond to external and internal security threats, and consolidate their domestic political positions."²⁶

Despite these attempts to discredit balance-of-threat theory's explanation of alliance formation, Walt has been able to respond effectively for several

18. Larson, "Bandwagoning Images."

19. Specifically, Larson measures the strength of a state not only by its size and capabilities but also by its level of institutional identity and elite legitimacy.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 103. For a similar argument, see J.W. Burton, *International Relations: A General Theory* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 173–185.

21. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," p. 235. See also David, "Why the Third World Still Matters;" David, *Choosing Sides*.

22. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," p. 236.

23. David asserts, "Third World leaders will bandwagon to a superpower threatening them in order to balance against the principal threats" being backed by that superpower. David, *Choosing Sides*, p. 25. But he claims that Egypt's realignment with the United States and Ethiopia's realignment with the Soviet Union during the 1970s are examples of omnibalancing rather than bandwagoning, because neither state appeased its primary threat. *Ibid.*, pp. 184, 186.

24. Levy and Barnett, "Alliance Formation," p. 22. See also Levy and Barnett, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments."

25. Levy and Barnett, "Alliance Formation," p. 23.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

reasons. First, his theory predicts most of the cases of bandwagoning that his critics attribute to domestic sources. According to the measures of power described by both Walt and Kenneth Waltz,²⁷ states with illegitimate leaders, weak governmental institutions, and/or little ability to mobilize economic resources are weak states that are likely to bandwagon anyway.²⁸ As for Kaufman's claim that democracies tend to bandwagon and cannot balance as effectively as balance-of-threat theory predicts, Walt convincingly refutes this argument by pointing out the ambiguity of Hitler's intentions prior to Munich and the vigorous democratic response after March 1939.²⁹

Second, the claim that fragile elites often bandwagon with secondary adversaries to counter their principal domestic threats is consistent with Walt's general argument that states balance against the most dangerous threat to their survival.³⁰ Third, Walt has an advantage in the debate because no one else has undertaken as extensive a survey of alliance formation in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, both Third World regions. This undercuts the claim by Walt's critics that realist theory cannot explain and is "relatively silent concerning" Third World alliances. As for the "resource-providing" function of alliances raised by Levy and Barnett, Walt indeed tests the hypothesis that "states select alliance partners in order to obtain side payments of material assistance, such as economic or military aid,"³¹ and finds little support for it.³² Finally, Walt's critics have not proposed a comprehensive alternative theory to challenge balance-of-threat theory. Thus it holds up fairly well as an explanation of alliance choices.

27. Waltz lists economic capability and political stability and competence as measures of state capabilities. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 131. Walt defines power as the product of several different components, including economic capability and political cohesion. In his discussion of Soviet penetration of South Yemen in the mid-1970s, Walt also cites the lack of established government institutions as a source of state weakness. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, pp. 250, 265.

28. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, pp. 29–31, 263. Similarly, Waltz writes: "The power of the strong may deter the weak from asserting their claims, not because the weak recognize a kind of rightfulness of rule on the part of the strong, but simply because it is not sensible to tangle with them." Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 113.

29. See Walt, "Alliance, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy," pp. 449–469.

30. For instance, David suggests that omnibalancing theory "explains why what is thought to be bandwagoning is really consistent with balancing behavior (albeit against internal threats)." David, *Choosing Sides*, p. 191.

31. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 218. For Walt's test of this hypothesis, see *ibid.*, pp. 219–242.

32. Walt's analysis of superpower foreign aid to the Middle East throughout the Cold War "suggests that, by itself, economic and military assistance has relatively little impact on alliance choices." *Ibid.*, p. 241.

Walt has so far won the debate because his critics, with the exception of Levy and Barnett, have accepted his premise that alliance choices are best examined as a response to threat, though some have broadened the focus to include internal as well as external threats. Consequently, the “domestic sources” challengers have not questioned Walt’s definition of bandwagoning as giving in to the most menacing threat.

I argue instead that the central premise of balance-of-threat theory stacks the deck in favor of disproportionately finding balancing over bandwagoning behavior. Defining bandwagoning as a form of capitulation, and thus examining only those alliances formed as a response to significant external threats, Walt not surprisingly finds that balancing is more common than bandwagoning. This is especially true among strong states, when credible allies are available, and in wartime prior to its becoming a “mopping-up” operation.³³

Alliance choices, however, are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger, by appetite as well as fear. Balance-of-threat theory is designed to consider only cases in which the goal of alignment is security, and so it systematically excludes alliances driven by profit. Yet, as Walt himself claims, one of the primary motivations for bandwagoning is to share in the spoils of victory. When profit rather than security drives alliance choices, there is no reason to expect that states will be threatened or cajoled to climb aboard the bandwagon; they do so willingly. The bandwagon gains momentum through the promise of rewards, not the threat of punishment. Thus, we will not observe cases of bandwagoning for profit by examining alliances as a response to threats. We must look instead at alliance choices made in the expectation of gain, unfettered by a desire for greater security.

Bandwagoning in Balance-of-Threat Theory

There are several problems with Walt’s definition of bandwagoning: it departs from conventional usage; it excludes common forms of bandwagoning for profit rather than security; and it reflects a status-quo bias. His conclusion that balancing is more common than bandwagoning is therefore somewhat misleading.

33. The absence of any one of these three conditions “may increase somewhat the likelihood of bandwagoning.” Walt, “Alliance, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy,” pp. 450–451; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, pp. 29–31.

CONVENTIONAL USAGE

The term “bandwagoning” as a description of international alliance behavior first appeared in Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*.³⁴ In his structural model of balance-of-power theory, Waltz uses “bandwagoning” to serve as the opposite of balancing: bandwagoning refers to joining the stronger coalition, balancing means allying with the weaker side.³⁵

Walt re-defines these terms to suit balance-of-threat theory: “When confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. *Balancing* is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; *bandwagoning* refers to alignment with the source of danger.”³⁶ By these definitions, Walt, like Waltz before him, intends to place the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning in polar opposition: bandwagoning is meant to serve as the opposite of balancing. Without exception, the literature on alliance behavior in international relations theory has accepted Walt’s definition of bandwagoning as aligning with the most menacing threat to a state’s independence.³⁷

In a later work, Walt fleshes out his definition of bandwagoning:

Bandwagoning involves *unequal exchange*; the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role. . . . Bandwagoning is an accommodation to pressure (either latent or manifest). . . . Most important of all, bandwagoning suggests a willingness to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by the dominant ally.³⁸

34. Waltz credits the term to Stephen Van Evera. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 126. Arnold Wolfers earlier mentioned the term “bandwagoning” to mean the opposite of balancing, but only in a passing reference. Arnold Wolfers, “The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice,” in Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 124.

35. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 126.

36. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 17. See also Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” p. 4.

37. Walt’s definition of bandwagoning is used by all of the authors in Jervis and Snyder, *Dominoes and Bandwagons*. Likewise, Eric J. Labs, Robert G. Kaufman, and Stephen M. Walt define bandwagoning as aligning with the source of danger in their essays for “Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: A Debate,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992). Stephen Van Evera also defines balancing as aligning against the the greatest threat to a state’s independence, while bandwagoning means “to give in to threats.” See Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), p. 20.

38. Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia”, p. 55. In a later passage (on p. 75), however, Walt seems to contradict himself when he states that dominoes may fall because, among other reasons, “one side’s victories convince other states to shift their alignment to the winning side *voluntarily*.” Strictly speaking, only the last variant should be viewed as bandwagoning” (emphasis added).

One of several criteria for selecting a taxonomy is the “avoidance of unnecessary departures from common usage.”³⁹ In borrowing the terms “balancing” and “bandwagoning” from balance-of-power theory, Walt wants to retain the original idea that “bandwagoning” should serve as the opposite of “balancing.” But in so doing, he violates the rule of common usage with respect to the concept of bandwagoning.⁴⁰

Conventional usage defines a bandwagon as a candidate, side, or movement that attracts adherents or amasses power by its momentum. The phrase “to climb aboard the bandwagon” implies following a current or fashionable trend or joining the side that appears likely to win. Bandwagoning may be freely chosen, or it can be the result of resignation to an inexorable force. By this standard, balance-of-power theory’s definition of bandwagoning as “joining the stronger coalition” is faithful to common usage. Balance-of-threat theory’s definition as “aligning with the source of danger” or “giving in to threats” only encompasses the coercive or compulsory aspect of the concept captured by the phrase: “If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em.”

In fact, the behavior Walt defines as bandwagoning comes very close to the concept of capitulation, defined as “the act of surrendering or of yielding (as to a dominant influence).”⁴¹ In keeping with ordinary language, bandwagoning should not assume involuntary support gained through coercion, which is instead capitulation. This distinction is not simply a matter of semantic taste. To see why, we must examine the motives Walt ascribes to bandwagoning:

What is the logic behind the bandwagoning hypothesis? Two distinct motives can be identified. First, bandwagoning may be adopted as a form of appeasement. By aligning with the threatening state or coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack on himself by diverting it elsewhere. Second, a state may align with the dominant side in war in order to share the spoils of victory. Mussolini’s declaration of war on France and Russia’s entry into the war against Japan in 1945 illustrate this type of bandwagoning, as do Italian and Rumanian alliance choices in World War I. By joining what they believed

39. David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 12.

40. For a discussion of “ordinary language” and conceptual definitions, see Felix E. Oppenheim, “The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 1: *Political Science: Scope and Theory* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 283–335, especially, pp. 307–309. See also Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, chap. 3.

41. *Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1986), p. 204.

was the stronger side, each hoped to make territorial gains at the end of the fighting.⁴²

Walt correctly points out that states bandwagon both out of fear of being despoiled and out of the desire to despoil others. But both motives for bandwagoning may be present even when there is no imbalance of threat, that is, when neither side is perceived as significantly more dangerous than the other.

Consider Walt's first motive for bandwagoning: to avoid attack.⁴³ For him, this means appeasing the most dangerous side. This need not be the case, however. Suppose war is coming, and a state caught in the crossfire must choose sides, but there is no imbalance of threat. Seeking shelter from the storm, the state may align with the stronger coalition because there is safety in numbers and its survival depends on its being on the winning side. Here, the source of greatest danger to the state does not come from one side or the other but from the consequences of being on the losing side, whichever that may be.⁴⁴ Thus power, not threat, drives the state's choice.

Walt's second motive for bandwagoning—to share the spoils of victory—is certainly correct, but it is not consistent with his claim that “balancing and bandwagoning are more accurately viewed as a response to threats” rather than power imbalances.⁴⁵ Security from Germany was not the primary motivation for Italy's declaration of war against France in 1940, or Japan's decision to bandwagon with the Axis later in the year. Similarly, Stalin's eagerness to fight Japan in 1945 was driven more by the prospect of gaining unearned spoils than a desire for greater security from the United States or Japan. The opportunistic aspect of bandwagoning is especially important for

42. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” pp. 7–8.

43. When the goal is to divert attack, bandwagoning is virtually indistinguishable from buck-passing behavior. Consider, for instance, the Nazi-Soviet pact. Were the Soviets bandwagoning to divert attack or passing the balancing buck to France and Britain? Are not these goals one and the same?

44. The Italians employed this strategy to survive the initial stage of the War of the Spanish Succession. Emperor Leopold of Austria opened the hostilities against the Franco-Spanish forces by attacking Italy, which he believed had been loyal to the Spanish regime of Louis XIV's grandson King Philip V, the seventeen-year-old Duke of Anjou. In truth, the “people of Italy had no particular love for either Bourbon or Hapsburg; they only wanted to be on the winning side.” Thus, when the Imperial army led by Prince Eugene of Savoy smashed Louis's forces under the command of General Villeroy at Chiari, Italy jumped on the Austrian bandwagon. Bitter over the pro-Imperial behavior of the Italians, Louis wrote: “You should be cautious and risk nothing with people who know how to profit by everything and who entrench themselves before you.” John B. Wolf, *Louis XIV* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), pp. 516 and 518.

45. Walt, “Alliance Formation,” p. 9.

assessing the alliance choices of revisionist states. Walt identifies this motive but then overlooks it because the logic of his theory forces him to conflate the various forms of bandwagoning into one category: giving in to threats.

CASE SELECTION

To determine whether balancing or bandwagoning is the dominant tendency, Walt considers only cases involving a significant external threat.⁴⁶ Walt’s causal scheme for alliance behavior may be diagrammed as in Table 1.

Holding constant the initial condition of a clear external threat in selecting his cases,⁴⁷ Walt finds strong evidence that balancing is the preferred response. But the theory thus only tests for balancing and appeasement-type bandwagoning among threatened states, while it ignores the behavior of unthreatened states that align for reasons other than security and that present the threats that drive Walt’s theory. In short, Walt does not offer a theory of alliances so much as a theory of how states respond to external threats.

The hard case for confirming the balancing hypothesis is a situation in which a state is not directly menaced by a predatory state but decides to balance against it anyway to protect its long-term security interests. In Walt’s words, “when examining the historical record, we should focus not only on what states did, but even more important, on what they preferred to do.”⁴⁸ But his cases are not designed to do this.

When confronted by a dire and unmistakable threat to national survival, statesmen “can be said to act under external compulsion rather than

Table 1. Walt’s Causal Scheme for Alliance Behavior.

Causal Variable	→	Dependent Variable
Significant External Threat (initial condition held constant)	→	Balancing or Bandwagoning (hypothesized behavior)

46. Each of the states in the two regions he examines, the Middle East and Southwest Asia since World War II, have at all times confronted external threats.

47. The level of threat does vary in the cases Walt considers. But when the state in question does not perceive a significant external threat, it cannot engage in either balancing or bandwagoning, since, by Walt’s own definitions, both behaviors are responses to the most dangerous threat to the state’s survival. For this reason, cases that do not involve significant external threats cannot be used to test for balancing versus bandwagoning behavior, as Walt defines these terms.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

in accordance with their preferences."⁴⁹ This is the logic behind Arnold Wolfers's well-known metaphor of a house on fire: With rare exceptions, we expect individuals inside a burning house to feel an irresistible compulsion to run toward the exits.⁵⁰ Similarly, when statesmen are confronted by a dangerous imbalance of threat, we would expect them to "rush to enhance or maximize national power,"⁵¹ especially under the conditions that Walt identifies as most favorable for balancing: when the threatened state is strong enough to affect the balance of power, allies are available, and the outcome of the war remains in doubt.

The problem is that the security literature has tended to overgeneralize Walt's findings by not specifying the conditions required for his theory to operate.⁵² Thus, it is commonly asserted, without supporting evidence, that "balancing behavior is the prevalent tendency of states."⁵³ Walt himself declares, "as I have argued at length elsewhere, balancing behavior predominates in international politics. . . . These results expose the poverty of much of the justification for U.S. foreign policy since World War II."⁵⁴ Similarly, Stephen Van Evera claims that bandwagoning is a "rare event" and "history indicates that such cases are the exception, not the rule."⁵⁵ Yet Van Evera's own argument in support of the 1990–91 Persian Gulf deployment rests almost entirely on bandwagoning logic:

Had Iraq gone unchecked, its seizure of Kuwait might have foreshadowed its seizure of the rest of the Arab Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman). . . . Syria, Jordan, Yemen, and Lebanon would then be vastly outmatched by Iraqi power, and might succumb to it.⁵⁶

49. Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in *Discord and Collaboration*, p. 13.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 13–16.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

52. For instance, Eric Labs defines bandwagoning as giving into threats and admits without explanation that he does not consider cases of "bandwagoning to share in the spoils of conquest." Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), p. 409. Consequently, Labs's claim that bandwagoning places last among small states' choices is misleading. He arrives at this conclusion by substituting "capitulation" for "bandwagoning" and by focusing on the alliance choices of only small states seeking to maintain what they have, excluding unthreatened, small states with irredenta that choose to align for profit.

53. Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," p. 36.

54. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment," p. 35.

55. Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 36–37. Also see Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), p. 62.

56. Stephen Van Evera, "American Intervention in the Third World: Less Would Be Better," *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn 1991), pp. 12 and 14.

In another reference to bandwagoning, Van Evera says “militaries exaggerate the tendency of other states to give in to threats—to ‘bandwagon’ with the threat instead of ‘balancing’ against it. Such myths bolster the military’s arguments for larger forces by reinforcing claims that a bigger force can be used to make diplomatic gains.”⁵⁷ Focusing exclusively on the threatened target of the military buildup, Van Evera does not consider how this signal affects other unthreatened states that may see themselves as beneficiaries of the larger military force. Historically, military buildups have sometimes served to encourage untargeted states to bandwagon with the “bigger force” for profit or for protection from other more threatening states. Dissatisfied states or those states that lack internal strength and stability tend to gravitate away from declining powers and towards a rising power.⁵⁸

THE STATUS-QUO BIAS

At bottom, balance-of-threat theory suffers from a problem that plagues all contemporary realist theory: it views the world solely through the lens of a satisfied, status-quo state.⁵⁹ Unlike traditional realists such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, modern realists typically assume that states are willing to pay high costs and take great risks to protect the values they possess, but will only pay a small price and take low risks to improve their position in the system. Waltz writes:

In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power. Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two

57. Van Evera, “Primed for Peace,” p. 20.

58. Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), p. 163. As Napoleonic France grew in power, it gained alliances with Spain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia; likewise, the expansion of Nazi Germany’s military power secured for Hitler pacts with Poland, Rumania, Italy, Hungary, Japan, and Russia, among others. 59. In contrast, postwar realists invariably distinguished two types of states: Morgenthau called them imperialistic and status-quo powers; Schuman employed the terms satiated and unsatiated powers; Kissinger referred to revolutionary and status-quo states; Carr distinguished satisfied from dissatisfied Powers; Johannes Mattern, among other geopoliticians, divided the world into “have” and “have-nots,” and Wolfers referred to status-quo and revisionist states. See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), esp. chaps. 2, 3, 9, 10, and p. 156; Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics: The Destiny of the Western State System*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), pp. 377–380; Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Harper & Row, 1946); Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich, and the Problem of Peace, 1812–22* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); Johannes Mattern, *Geopolitics: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1942); Wolfers, “The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice,” pp. 125–126.

coalitions. . . . If states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side . . . this does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.⁶⁰

Waltz is right to say that states seeking to maximize their power will bandwagon, not balance. But it is simply not true that the first concern of *all* states is security.⁶¹ Here, he takes a distinctly status-quo perspective.⁶² Only in reference to satisfied countries can it be said that the primary goal is “to maintain their positions in the system.”⁶³ In contrast, classical realists described the “true interests” of states as “a continuous striving for greater power and expansion.” For them, the goal of diplomacy was “to evaluate

60. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 126.

61. In this regard, Joseph M. Grieco has coined the term “defensive positionality,” which essentially posits that the primary goal of states is to prevent relative losses. He argues that “it is a defensively positional concern that partners might do better—not an offensively oriented interest in doing better oneself—that drives the relative-gains problem for cooperation.” Grieco, “The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), p. 742 (emphasis in original). See also Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), p. 498. Similarly, Robert Gilpin says international competition “stimulates, and may compel, a state to increase its power; at the least, it necessitates that the prudent state prevent relative increase in the powers of competitor states.” Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 87–88.

62. For a more recent example of neorealism’s status-quo bias, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137–168. By combining two “top-shelf” realist theories, Christensen and Snyder purport to explain alliance patterns in Europe prior to World Wars I and II. Absent from their discussion, however, are the alliance choices of the members of the revisionist coalitions: Austria-Hungary and Turkey prior to World War I, and Italy and Japan prior to World War II. Moreover, they examine Hitler’s strategy of piecemeal aggression but do not mention Germany’s alliance choices.

63. Waltz admits that states may seek profit and power, but he says that they must pursue them “safely” and only “if survival is assured.” This view of state preferences is aptly described by Arthur Stein: “States that place preeminent weight on security and do not gamble with it regardless of temptation to do so may, for example, act to maximize assured security rather than expected payoffs. Such states would undertake attractive gambles only when assured of survival.” Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 90. In rational-choice terminology, this is known as lexicographic preferences: actors have a hierarchy of objectives and maximize in sequence rather than making trade-offs. See Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., “Balance of Power and the Maintenance of ‘Balance’: A Rational-Choice Model With Lexical Preferences,” in Dina A. Zinnes and John V. Gillespie, eds., *Mathematical Models in International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 318–332.

correctly the interplay of opposing forces and interests and to create a constellation favorable to conquest and expansion."⁶⁴

This aside, preventing relative losses in power and prestige is sound advice for satisfied states that seek, above all, to keep what they have. But staying in place is not the primary goal of revisionist states. They want to increase, not just preserve, their core values and to improve their position in the system. These goals cannot be achieved simply by ensuring that everyone else does not gain relative to them. They must gain relative to others. Arnold Wolfers recognized this when he wrote: "[Revisionist states] can accept balanced power only with utter resignation since they know that only in quite exceptional cases can the established order be seriously modified without the threat of force so preponderant that it will overcome the resistance of the opposing side."⁶⁵

Calling for a "new order," dissatisfied states are attracted to expanding revisionist powers. Waltz overlooks such states when he asserts: "Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side they are both more appreciated and safer."⁶⁶ That states are safer on the weaker side is a curious claim. Are they also more appreciated by the weaker side? Consider, for instance, the case of Italy in 1936. Mussolini believed that he would be more appreciated and politically autonomous as Hitler's satellite than as a member of the weaker Anglo-French coalition. Unlike Britain and France, Nazi Germany supported Mussolini's goal of turning the Mediterranean into an "Italian Lake."⁶⁷ Moreover, Mussolini's decision to hitch Italy's wagon to the rising

64. Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 95–96. Of contemporary realists, Fareed Zakaria, Samuel P. Huntington, and John J. Mearsheimer come closest in their views of state interest to that of eighteenth-century power politics. See Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 177–198; Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68–83; and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 12.

65. Wolfers, "The Balance of Power," p. 126.

66. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 127. I am grateful to Michael Desch for drawing my attention to this point. For more on balancing behavior and the goal of autonomy, see Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 17; Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 82; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 74.

67. "Any future modifications of the Mediterranean balance of power," Hitler told Ciano in

Nazi star was motivated by his raw Social-Darwinist predilections. As Alan Cassels asserts, "Fascists worshipped strength, and what Mussolini called a fascist foreign policy meant in effect siding with the strongest power."⁶⁸

In the end, Italy paid a high price for siding with Germany. This did not prove to be the safer choice, but it was not because Italy joined the stronger coalition, as Waltz's logic would have us believe. To the contrary, Italy was crushed because, after the United States actively entered the war, it was on the weaker side.

The general point is that most states, even of the Great-Power variety, must ultimately serve someone; only top dogs can expect otherwise. And because members of military alliances always sacrifice some foreign-policy autonomy, the most important determinant of alignment decisions is the compatibility of political goals, not imbalances of power or threat.⁶⁹ Satisfied powers will join the status-quo coalition, even when it is the stronger side; dissatisfied powers, motivated by profit more than security, will bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state.

Bandwagoning for Rewards

As mentioned, Walt associates bandwagoning with giving in to threats, unequal exchange favoring the dominant power, acceptance of illegitimate actions by the stronger ally, and involuntary compliance. This view of the concept illustrates the tendency among political scientists to ignore the role of positive inducements in the exercise of power. Yet, positive sanctions are the most effective means to induce bandwagoning behavior. States, like delegates at party conventions, are lured to the winning side by the promise

1936, "must be in Italy's favour." Count Galeazzo Ciano, *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, edited by Malcolm Muggeridge (London: Odhams Press, 1948), p. 57.

68. Alan Cassels, "Switching Partners: Italy in A.J.P. Taylor's *Origins of the Second World War*," in Gordon Martel, ed., *"The Origins of the Second World War" Reconsidered: The A.J.P. Taylor Debate After Twenty-Five Years* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 82.

69. For example, in 1940, the British ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps, was sent to Moscow to persuade Stalin that German expansion in Western Europe endangered Russia as well as Britain. "Therefore both countries," he argued, "ought to agree on a common policy of self-protection against Germany and on the re-establishment of the European balance of power." Stalin replied that he did not see any danger of Europe being engulfed by Germany. "The so-called European balance of power," he said, "had hitherto oppressed not only Germany but also the Soviet Union. Therefore the Soviet Union would take all measures to prevent the re-establishment of the old balance of power in Europe." Wight, "The Balance of Power," p. 155.

of future rewards.⁷⁰ By contrast, relying on force to coerce states to bandwagon involuntarily often backfires for the dominant partner. Seeking revenge, the unwilling bandwagoner becomes a treacherous ally that will bolt from the alliance the first chance it gets.

During the Italian Wars of 1494 to 1517, for instance, Venice “recklessly chang[ed] over to the side of the French, lured by the prospect of gaining more territory on the Italian mainland,”⁷¹ namely, half of Lombardy. Later, by the secret Treaty of Granada of November 11, 1500, Spain’s Ferdinand of Aragon bandwagoned with Louis XII of France to rob the king of Naples of his kingdom.⁷² Then, in 1508, the allies of the League of Cambrai—France, Spain, and Austria—bandwagoned to cut up the Venetian territories.⁷³ Finally, in 1513, Henry VIII of England bandwagoned with the Holy League against the weaker Franco-Venetian side to gain provinces in Northern France.⁷⁴

During the period 1667–79, Louis XIV’s France achieved hegemonic status in Europe largely by promising rewards to attract bandwagoners. For example, in the War of Devolution (1667–68), Emperor Leopold I of the Austrian Hapsburgs bandwagoned with France to partition Spain. By the secret Franco-Austrian treaty of 1668, the French Bourbons were to inherit Spanish Navarre, the Southern Netherlands, Franche-Comté, Naples and Sicily, and

70. “Delegates wish to be on bandwagons because support of the nominee at the convention will be a basic criterion for the later distribution of Presidential favors and patronage.” Gerald Pomper, *Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention Choice* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 144.

71. R.B. Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy, 1451–1789* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), p. 28.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 31; Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955), pp. 165–166. After capturing Naples, Spain and France quarreled over the spoils, unleashing the Franco-Spanish wars for Italy that lasted with only occasional breaks for nearly sixty years.

73. “All princes who had any claims upon Venice, or rather upon its lands and possessions, were to be invited to join in the operations. The frontiers of Milan and Naples were to be readjusted in favour of Louis and Ferdinand, those of the Empire and Austria in favour of Maximilian, and those of the States of the Church in favour of the Pope.” Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy*, pp. 33–34. For the precise territorial arrangements contained in the secret Treaty of Blois, see Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, trans. and ed. by Sidney Alexander (New York: Macmillan, [1561] 1969), book 8, pp. 191–207, esp. p. 196.

74. Mowat, *European Diplomacy*, p. 39; Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, Books 10 and 11, especially pp. 243 and 276. In the partitions of the Milanese between France and Venice, Naples between France and Spain, and Venice among the allies of the League of Cambrai, the governing principle was “the biggest dog gets the meatiest bone, and others help themselves in the order of size.” Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 163. Dismembering the victim’s territory according to the relative size of the conquerors supports classical realism’s stress on power as the determining factor in international relations, but it contradicts the “defensive positionalist” tenet of avoiding gains gaps for security reasons.

the Philippines, in exchange for which Louis ceded his rights to the Spanish Crown.⁷⁵

In preparation for the Dutch War (1672–79), Louis offered rewards to gain the support of virtually all the powers that had previously opposed him. Charles II of England signed the June 1670 Treaty of Dover, with plans for a joint Anglo-French attack against the Dutch in 1672, in exchange for Louis's agreement to provide England subsidies of £225,000 a year and territorial gains around the Scheldt estuary. In April 1672, Sweden, too, abandoned what was left of the Triple Alliance and jumped on the French bandwagon against the Dutch. Between 1670 and 1672, Louis offered the payment of French subsidies to gain alliances with many of the former members of the defunct League of the Rhine, including the Rhenish archbishop-electors, Saxony, the Palatinate, Bavaria, the Archbishop-Elector of Cologne, and the Bishop of Münster. And while he did not ally with France, Leopold I signed a neutrality agreement in November 1671.⁷⁶

The peace of Nijmegen that ended the Dutch War in 1679 proved that Louis could take on all his enemies and still dictate the peace. A contemporary statesman declared: "France has already become the arbiter of Europe . . . , henceforth no prince will find security or profit except with the friendship and alliance of the King of France."⁷⁷

Like his predecessor, Napoleon Bonaparte used territorial rewards and spectacular military victories to attract bandwagoners. For example, in creating the Confederation of the Rhine (1806) as a counterweight to Prussia and Austria, Napoleon strengthened Bavaria, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Württemberg at the expense of the tiny German states. Lured by the promise of aggrandizement, these middle-sized German states voluntarily climbed aboard Napoleon's bandwagon.⁷⁸

75. David Kaiser, *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 149 and 172. Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648–1815* (London: Longman, 1983), pp. 14–23.

76. McKay and Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers*, pp. 23–35.

77. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 36. For a detailed account of Louis's preparations for the Dutch War, see Paul G. Sonnino, *Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

78. David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 449–450; Mowat, *The Diplomacy of Napoleon*, chap. 16. In Article 1 of the Franco-Bavarian treaty of alliance (August 24, 1805), Napoleon pledged "to seize all occasions which present themselves to augment the power and splendour of the House of Bavaria," in return for support by 20,000 Bavarian troops. See *ibid.*, p. 152. Likewise, greed not security, Mowat claims, animated Baden's decision to bandwagon with France: "The Elector of Baden, in the preamble of the treaty, gives

Similarly, Alexander I bandwagoned with the French Empire in 1807, when Napoleon not only used his decisive victory over the tsar's army at Friedland to force an alliance, but coupled it with the reward of the Vistula as the new expanded frontier of Russia. Napoleon also offered Russia control over European Turkey and Finland, and he encouraged further Russian conquests in Asia. In exchange, the tsar was asked to join the Continental System against England, use his influence to compel Denmark and Sweden to follow suit, and send the Russian Navy to aid France in the capture of Gibraltar.⁷⁹ As the historian R.B. Mowat put it: "Thus a prospect was held out to the defeated autocrat not merely of keeping what he possessed, but actually of gaining more territory: a strange sequel to the *débâcle* of Russia at Friedland!"⁸⁰

Saying, "I will be your second against England," Alexander quickly accepted the proffered alliance with France, which "put the Continent of Europe at the disposal of the two Powers of France and Russia, with, however, the balance distinctly in favour of France."⁸¹ During the Franco-Austrian war of 1809, Alexander proved his loyalty to Napoleon by "fail[ing] to avail himself of the opportunity to 'hold the balance' between the antagonists, with the result that France once more defeated Austria, added more territory to her already bulging empire, and threw the European system still further out of balance."⁸² The defeated Austrian state was shorn of most of its possessions in Italy, Illyria, and Germany.

Napoleon's amiability toward Russia at Tilsit did not carry over to Prussia. After crushing the Prussian army at Jena, Napoleon was determined to exact his pound of flesh from King William Frederick for inciting war against him. By the Prussian Treaty of Tilsit, William suffered the humiliating loss of one-third of his territory,⁸³ nearly half of his subjects and, most stinging of all,

the curious reason for making it, that 'the renewal of hostilities threatened the independence of the States of the German Empire'; therefore he joined with that Empire's enemy. The real reason is . . . that the Elector of Baden, through the support of France in 1802-03, had gained greatly in territory." *Ibid.*, p. 154.

79. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*, p. 588; Mowat, *The Diplomacy of Napoleon*, chap. 18; Georges Lefebvre, *Napoleon: From 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, 1799-1807*, trans. Henry F. Stockhold (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 272-275.

80. Mowat, *The Diplomacy of Napoleon*, p. 176.

81. *Ibid.*, pp. 177, 182.

82. Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1955), p. 106.

83. Virtually all of Prussia's possessions west of the Elbe were torn away and incorporated into the new Kingdom of Westphalia or merged into a Grand Duchy of Warsaw ruled by the King of Saxony.

the occupation of French garrisons on Prussian soil pending full payment of a war indemnity.⁸⁴

Ironically, it was the Prussian foreign minister, Karl von Hardenberg, who, at Tilsit, had advised Alexander “to offer Napoleon a three-cornered alliance whose purpose would be to fight England and to redraw the map of Europe.” Agreeing in principle to Hardenberg’s plan, the tsar did his best to defend his Prussian ally in his private meetings with the French emperor, but to no avail. Napoleon held all of Prussia by right of conquest and would not consider admitting Frederick William as a third party.⁸⁵

Prussia and Austria got their revenge in June of 1813, when they joined England and Russia to form the Fourth Coalition that defeated France. But the victory of the Allies over the would-be hegemon was not as inevitable as the “balancing predominates” view would have us believe. The Allied coalition, whose forces doubled those of France by February of 1814, would never have come together in the first place, much less held together, had Napoleon not attacked his own allies and neutrals. By repeatedly thwarting the bandwagoning strategies of Russia, Prussia, Spain, and Austria, Napoleon finally succeeded where the British had failed in creating a coalition with the strength and resolve to defeat Imperial France.⁸⁶

Why States Bandwagon

Bandwagoning dynamics move the system in the direction of change. Like a ball rolling down an incline, initial success generates further success, not greater resistance. In the language of systems theory, bandwagoning is a form of positive feedback. By contrast, the purpose of balancing behavior is

84. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon*, pp. 589ff; Lefebvre, *Napoleon*, pp. 273–274; Mowat, *The Diplomacy of Napoleon*, pp. 175–187. In practice, the indemnity, which was of an undefined amount, meant that Napoleon could defer the evacuation forever by imposing payments beyond Prussia’s capacity. Mowat writes: “Simple, dishonest, cynical, Napoleon’s method of veiled annexation was put in practice, and French troops remained in Prussia until driven out by force in 1813.” *Ibid.*, p. 186.

85. Lefebvre, *Napoleon*, p. 272.

86. For more on this point, see Paul W. Schroeder, “Napoleon’s Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise,” *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (April 1990), pp. 147–162; and Schroeder, “The Collapse of the Second Coalition,” *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 59 (1987), pp. 244–290. Holland, Italy, and the maritime states of Scandinavia, Denmark, and Portugal were similarly coerced into bandwagoning with the French Empire.

to prevent systemic disequilibrium or, when deterrence fails, to restore the balance. Balancing is a form of negative feedback.⁸⁷

This is not to suggest that bandwagoning effects are always undesirable; this depends on the nature of the existing order. If it is characterized by conflict, bandwagoning behavior may enhance the prospects for a more durable peace. In this regard, the bandwagon's *raison d'être* also matters. "Jackal" bandwagoning, with a rising expansionist state or a coalition that seeks to overthrow the status quo, decreases system stability. Conversely, "piling on" bandwagoning with the stronger status-quo coalition enhances system stability. Other forms of bandwagoning may have varying effects on system stability. What all these forms of bandwagoning have in common, however, is that they are motivated by the prospect of making gains. Herein lies the fundamental difference between bandwagoning and balancing. Balancing is an extremely costly activity that most states would rather not engage in, but sometimes must to survive and protect their values. Bandwagoning rarely involves costs and is typically done in the expectation of gain. This is why bandwagoning is more common, I believe, than Walt and Waltz suggest.

JACKAL BANDWAGONING

Just as the lion attracts jackals, a powerful revisionist state or coalition attracts opportunistic revisionist powers.⁸⁸ The goal of "jackal bandwagoning" is profit. Specifically, revisionist states bandwagon to share in the spoils of victory.⁸⁹ Because unlimited-aims revisionist powers cannot bandwagon (they *are* the bandwagon), offensive bandwagoning is done exclusively by lesser aggressors, which I call limited-aims revisionist states. Typically, the lesser aggressor reaches an agreement with the unlimited-aims revisionist leader

87. See Robert Jervis, "Systems Theory and Diplomatic History," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 220–222; Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Jervis and Snyder, *Dominoes and Bandwagons*, pp. 22–23; Lisa L. Martin, "Coalition Dynamics: Bandwagoning in International Politics," paper presented at Columbia University, Seminar on International Political Economy, October, 29, 1993.

88. "In a style less grave than that of history, I should perhaps compare the emperor Alexius to the jackal, who is said to follow the steps, and to devour the leavings, of the lion. Whatever had been his fears and toils in the passage of the first crusade, they were amply recompensed by the subsequent benefits which he derived from the exploits of the Franks." Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Vol. 6 (New York: Macmillan, 1914), p. 335.

89. For this motivation for bandwagoning, see Larson, "Bandwagon Images," pp. 85–87; Jervis, "Systems Theory," p. 220; and Walt, "Alliance Formation," p. 8. None of these authors specifically refer to jackal behavior.

on spheres of influence, in exchange for which the junior partner supports the revisionist leader in its expansionist aims.

Aside from the desire to acquire additional territory, the motivation for jackal bandwagoning may also be security from the lion itself. As Roy Douglas remarks, "Stalin merits Churchill's famous epithet, 'Hitler's jackal' as richly as does Mussolini, to whom it was applied. Pickings from the lion's kill were succulent and satisfying for lesser beasts; but they also afforded these creatures strength to resist the greater predator should he later turn his attentions to them."⁹⁰

Sometimes the revisionist leader is stronger than the opposing status-quo coalition. In such cases, the revisionist leader does not require the active assistance of the junior partner. Instead, it seeks to prevent or block the formation of a powerful status-quo coalition.⁹¹ When blocking is the goal, the revisionist leader often allows the limited-aims revisionist state to gain unearned spoils in exchange for a pledge not to join the adversarial coalition. Because the jackal is a scavenger and not a true predator, this type of bandwagoning is a form of predatory buck-passing: the jackal seeks to ride free on the offensive efforts of others.

Exemplifying this strategy, Hitler encouraged Italy, the Soviet Union, Japan, Hungary, and Bulgaria to feed on the pickings of the Nazi lion's kill, in order to block the formation of a dangerous rival coalition.⁹² In this way, the Reich became master of Europe by 1941. But just as Napoleon had gratuitously destroyed the source of his own success by attacking his allies, Hitler brought Germany to ruin by declaring war against his Soviet ally and the United States, "two World powers who asked only to be left alone."⁹³ In so

90. Roy Douglas, *New Alliances, 1940-41* (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 40. Walt makes this point in "Alliance Formation," p. 8.

91. See George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 33.

92. For example, Mussolini and Hitler successfully played on Hungary's and Bulgaria's revisionist aspirations to lure these states into the Axis camp. As part of the Munich agreement of September 30, 1938, a German-Italian court of arbitration pressured the Czech government to grant a broad strip of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia to Hungary. Then, when the Germans carved up the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Hitler, in a deliberate attempt to gain further favor with the Hungarian government, ceded the remainder of Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) to Hungary. In exchange for these territorial rewards, Hungary pledged its unshakable support for the Nazi cause, and its "foreign policy was brought into line with that of the Reich. On February 24, 1939, Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, on April 11 it left the League of Nations." Norman Rich, *Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion* (London: W.W. Norton, 1973), p. 184.

93. A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Atheneum, 1961), p. 278.

doing, the Führer forced into creation the only coalition powerful enough to prevent a German victory in Europe.

PILING ON

“Piling-on bandwagoning” occurs when the outcome of a war has already been determined. States typically bandwagon with the victor to claim an unearned share of the spoils. When this is the motive, piling on is simply jackal bandwagoning that takes place at the end of wars. Contrariwise, states may pile on because they fear the victors will punish them if they do not actively side against the losers. Whatever the motivation, either opportunity or fear, piling on is a form of predatory buck-passing with regard to the winning coalition.

Historically, most major wars have ended with piling-on behavior. In the War of the Spanish Succession, for instance, Louis XIV watched his waning hopes for victory vanish when two of his staunchest allies, Portugal and the Duke of Savoy, deserted the Franco-Spanish coalition and bandwagoned with the Grand Alliance to make gains at Spain’s expense.⁹⁴ The Napoleonic Wars ended when Sweden, Austria, Spain, and certain German and Italian states sided with Prussia, Britain, and Russia at the precise moment that Napoleon’s defeat appeared certain.⁹⁵

During the First World War, Japan bandwagoned with the Entente powers because it coveted German possessions in Asia, while China bandwagoned to gain Anglo-French protection from Japan and Imperial Russia. For its part Italy, expecting to gain unearned spoils at Austria’s expense, declared war against its former friends in May of 1915.⁹⁶ In 1916, Russia’s decisive victory over Austria persuaded Rumania to enter the war on the Allied side.

In World War II, the Soviets wanted a fight to the finish with Japan to get in on the kill and thereby share in occupying Japan. In contrast, Turkey wanted to remain neutral but was coerced by the Allies into declaring war against Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945. Ankara did so because of the Allied decision to exclude from the organizing conference for the United

94. Wolf, *Louis XIV*, pp. 526–529. For similar reasons, on August 16, 1703, Sweden also acceded to the Grand Alliance. Thus, by October of 1703, “France was left with no allies except Spain, and the Electorates of Cologne and Bavaria . . . ; and when one by one the other satellites of Louis dropped off, in 1702 and 1703, Bavaria alone kept to her engagements.” Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy*, p. 166.

95. Gulick, *Europe’s Classical Balance of Power*, p. 88.

96. The Allies were not impressed, however, and awarded Italy a loser’s share at Versailles.

Nations any country that had not entered the war against the Axis by March 1, 1945. More recently, the overwhelmingly superior coalition arrayed against Iraq in the Gulf War exemplifies piling-on bandwagoning behavior.

WAVE OF THE FUTURE

States may bandwagon with the stronger side because they believe it represents the “wave of the future.” During the Cold War era, for example, many less-developed countries viewed communism in this way. Consequently, they did not have to be coerced or bribed to join the Sino-Soviet bloc; they did so voluntarily. Third World elites as well as the masses were attracted to communism for rational reasons: they thought they could profit by it, as had the Chinese and the Soviets. This type of bandwagoning most concerned George Kennan in 1947, as he understood that “a given proportion of the adherents to the [communist] movement are drawn to it . . . primarily by the belief that it is the coming thing, the movement of the future . . . and that those who hope to survive—let alone to thrive—in the coming days will be those who have the foresight to climb on the bandwagon when it was still the movement of the future.”⁹⁷ And indeed, the Soviet success with Sputnik caused more dominoes to fall than Soviet military pressure ever could.

Likewise, states across the globe have recently abandoned communism in favor of the newest wave of the future, liberal democracy. Van Evera points out that “the chain of anti-communist upheavals in Eastern Europe during 1989” is “the only widespread domino effect on record.”⁹⁸ But the definition of bandwagoning as “giving in to threats,” which he endorses, does not cover this voluntary global epidemic. The same can be said about the massive decolonization of the 1950s and 1960s. Both trends are instances of benign positive feedback; that is, they altered the course of international politics in a more stabilizing direction.

Wave-of-the-future bandwagoning is typically induced by charismatic leaders and dynamic ideologies, especially when buoyed by massive propaganda

97. Quoted in Jervis, “Domino Beliefs,” p. 33.

98. Stephen Van Evera, “Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn’t: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1990), p. 23. On this latest domino effect, see Harvey Starr, “Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 356–381; Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (October 1991), pp. 7–48.

campaigns and demonstrations of superiority on the battlefield. Here, the bandwagon becomes a “mass orgy feeling that sweeps with the fervor of a religious revival.”⁹⁹ For example, Germany’s stunning military victories in May of 1940 convinced Japan to reverse its neutralist policy and bandwagon with the Axis. Hosoya writes:

The rising prestige of Germany in the eyes of the Japanese resulted in resurrecting pro-Nazi sentiment from its demise following the conclusion of the Nonaggression Pact. This change in public opinion naturally affected the balance of power between the Anglo-American and Axis factions in Japan. Second, the existence of the French and Dutch colonies in Indochina and the East Indies now swam into the ken of the Japanese people, and a mood to seize the opportunity to advance into Southeast Asia spread to all strata of society.¹⁰⁰

In this case, the Japanese public’s psychological desire to support a winner dovetailed with their more rational interest in jackal opportunism. Both goals were captured by Japan’s catch-phrase of the day, “Don’t miss the bus.”¹⁰¹

In its rarest form, wave-of-the-future bandwagoning may be the result of leaders and their publics simply enjoying “the feeling of ‘going with the winner’—even a winner about whose substantive qualities they have no illusions.”¹⁰² Recognizing this effect, Machiavelli pointed to the results of the Venetians having foolishly invited King Louis “to plant his foot in Italy”:

The king, then, having acquired Lombardy, immediately won back the reputation lost by Charles. Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his friends, the Marquis of Mantua, the Dukes of Ferrara and Bentivogli, the Lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, the inhabitants of Lucca, of Pisa, and of Siena, all approached him with offers of friendship. The Venetians might then have seen the effects of their te-

99. Ralph G. Martin, *Ballots and Bandwagons* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 444. Also see Steven J. Brams, *The Presidential Election Game* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 43.

100. Hosoya Chihiro, “The Tripartite Pact, 1939–1940,” in James William Morley, ed., *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935–1940* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 206.

101. Sumio Hatano and Sadao Asada, “The Japanese Decision to Move South (1939–1941),” in Robert Boyce and Esmonde M. Robertson, eds., *Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), p. 387; Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 158; Hosoya “The Tripartite Pact,” p. 207.

102. Bartels, *Presidential Primaries*, pp. 111–112.

merity, how to gain a few cities in Lombardy they had made the king ruler over two-thirds of Italy.¹⁰³

Other examples of supporting-the-winner bandwagoning include the near-unanimous enthusiasm with which the southern German states joined Prussia after its defeat of France in 1871, and the Austrians' embrace of the *Anschluss* with Germany in 1938.

THE CONTAGION OR DOMINO EFFECT

Throughout the Cold War era, the metaphors of "spreading disease" and "falling dominoes" were used interchangeably by U.S. officials to support the policy of containing communism. The Truman administration employed the contagion metaphor to justify intervening in Greece in 1947: "Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the East. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, to Europe and France."¹⁰⁴ The same argument became known as the "domino theory" when President Eisenhower used the metaphor in reference to Southeast Asia: "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences."¹⁰⁵ More recently, President Reagan argued that if we "ignore the malignancy in Managua," it will "spread and become a mortal threat to the entire New World."¹⁰⁶

Whether the metaphor is infection or falling dominoes, the underlying dynamic is the same. In each case, the bandwagon is set in motion by an external force, which touches off a chain reaction, fueling the bandwagon at ever-greater speeds. Thus, the domino theory posits revolutions as "essen-

103. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince and The Discourses* (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 12.

104. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 219. Also quoted in Jerome Slater, "Dominos in Central America: Will They Fall? Does It Matter?" *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall 1987), p. 106. Studies in American politics also use the metaphor of spreading disease to describe bandwagoning effects among voters. See Larry M. Bartels, *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 111.

105. Quoted in Ross Gregory, "The Domino Theory," in Alexander DeConde, ed., *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), p. 275. Also quoted in Slater, "Dominos in Central America," p. 105.

106. Quoted in Slater, "Dominos in Central America," p. 106. For a similar critique of the domino theory, see Robert H. Johnson, "Exaggerating America's Stakes in Third World Conflicts," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 39–40.

tially external events" that spread quickly because countries within a region are tightly linked and "because revolutions actively seek to export themselves."¹⁰⁷ Similarly, the contagion effect proposes tight regional linkages and cascading alliances as explanations for the spread of war.¹⁰⁸

Although associated with the spread of revolution and war, this type of bandwagoning dynamic can also exert a positive influence on the stability of the international system. Consider, for instance, the 1993 land-for-peace accord between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel. In response to the agreement, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon are each reportedly seeking similar arrangements with Israel. In the words of Uri Savir, director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry who led the Israeli team in the secret negotiations with the PLO in Norway, "With all the progress around, everybody in the region seems to make an effort to jump on this new bandwagon."¹⁰⁹ In what appears to be the latest aftershock of the historic earthquake that ended the Cold War, a peculiar domino effect is unfolding in the Middle East—peculiar in that it is being welcomed by most scholars and practitioners of international relations.

An Alternative Theory of Alliances: Balance of Interests

I have argued that states tend to bandwagon for profit rather than security and that contemporary realist theory, because of its status-quo bias, has underestimated the extent of bandwagoning behavior. In order to bring the revisionist state back in to the study of alliances, I propose a theory of balance-of-interests. The concept of balance of interests has a dual meaning, one at the unit level, the other at the systemic level. At the unit level, it refers to the costs a state is willing to pay to defend its values relative to the costs it is willing to pay to extend its values. At the systemic level, it refers to the relative strengths of status quo and revisionist states.

107. Slater, "Dominos in Central America," p. 107.

108. For a good overview of the empirical literature on the spread of wars through diffusion or contagion effects, see Benjamin A. Most, Harvey Starr, and Randolph M. Siverson, "The Logic and Study of the Diffusion of International Conflict," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 111–139.


109. Quoted in Clyde Haberman, "Israel and Syria Reported Ready To Negotiate About Golan Heights," *New York Times*, September, 6, 1993, p. A3.

BALANCE OF INTERESTS AT THE UNIT LEVEL

By relaxing neorealism’s assumption that states value what they possess more than what they covet, the full range of state interest emerges: some states value what they covet more than what they have; others are entirely satisfied with their possessions; still others value what they have only slightly more than what they covet, and vice versa; some states consider their possessions meager but are not envious of others.

We may conceptualize this range of state interest in the following way. Let x be the costs a given state is willing to pay to increase its values; and y be the costs the same state is willing to pay to defend the values it already has.¹¹⁰ Let x and y range from 0 to n . The state’s interest can then be represented as $x-y$ and will fall somewhere on the line shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. State Interest (n) = (value of revision) – (value of status quo).



NOTE: The top line represents the state’s calculation of its relative interests in the values of revision and of the status quo. Where the status quo outweighs revision (where n is negative), states are satiated; where revision outweighs the status quo (n is positive), states are revisionist.

110. For this conceptualization, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 51. Jervis calls this the state’s “basic intention.” For a similar scheme, see Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497–538. Glaser uses the concepts of myopia and greed.

LIONS. Lions are states that will pay high costs to protect what they possess but only a small price to increase what they value. The primary goal of these states is consistent with contemporary realism's assumption of actors as defensive positionalists and security-maximizers. As extremely satisfied states, they are likely to be status-quo powers of the first rank.

The choice of the lion to represent these states is partly motivated by Machiavelli's famous discussion of the lion and the fox: "A prince being thus obliged to know well how to act as a beast must imitate the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten wolves."¹¹¹

Just as lions are the king of the jungle, satisfied Great Powers rule and manage the international system. After all, states that find the status quo most agreeable are usually the ones that created the existing order; as the principal beneficiaries of the status quo, they more than anyone else have a vested interest in preserving it.¹¹² And just as lions "frighten wolves," status-quo Great Powers must deter powerful revisionist states from aggression or, if that fails, bear the brunt of the fighting in order to defeat them. They take on these responsibilities not primarily in the expectation of gain or for altruistic reasons, but rather for self-preservation and to maintain their relative positions and prestige in the system.¹¹³ Providing for the common defense is a dirty job, but someone has to do it, and only Great Powers can.¹¹⁴ As Walter Lippmann put it: "Only a great power can resist a great power. Only a great power can defeat a great power."¹¹⁵ If they believe that others will provide these collective goods for them, however, they will be tempted to pass the buck.

LAMBS. Lambs are countries that will pay only low costs to defend or extend their values. In a world of predators and prey, these states are prey.

111. Machiavelli, *The Prince and The Discourses*, p. 64.

112. This argument is consistent with the power-transition model. See A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), chap. 1, especially pp. 19–23; and Gilpin, *War and Change*.

113. Great-power cooperation to manage the system is often achieved by spheres of interest and informal empires. See Jan Triska, ed., *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986).

114. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Common Defense and Great-Power Responsibilities," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, No. 5 (1986), pp. 719–732, especially p. 725.

115. Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), p. 100. Quoted in Michael C. Desch, "The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery," *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), p. 87.

Lambs are weak states in that they possess relatively few capabilities, or suffer from poor state-society relations for a variety of reasons: their elites and institutions may lack legitimacy with the masses; they may be internally divided along ethnic, political, class, religious, or tribal lines; the state's ideology may conflict with and be imposed on the popular culture; or they may be what Samuel Huntington calls torn countries: states "that have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another."¹¹⁶

Because lambs are unwilling to sacrifice to extend their values, their foreign policy is not driven by irredentist aims. This distinguishes them from jackals, which may also be weak states. Lambs often bandwagon, as Walt implies, to divert and appease threats. But some, especially torn countries, engage in wave-of-the-future and domino bandwagoning. Others ally with the stronger side for protection from more pressing dangers, or out of fear of being despoiled if they wind up on the losing side. Examples of lambs are Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Austria, Yugoslavia, and France during the 1930s. Except for Rumania,¹¹⁷ the decision of each to bandwagon with Hitler was facilitated by the successful penetration by Nazi fifth columns into the state and large segments of society.¹¹⁸

In addition to bandwagoning, lambs may choose not to align with either side but instead to distance themselves from more directly threatened states. In adopting a policy of distancing,¹¹⁹ they seek the boon Odysseus sought

116. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 42. Huntington offers Turkey, Mexico, and Russia as examples of torn countries. See *ibid.*, pp. 42–45.

117. Rumania bandwagoned with the Axis for protection from Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, which viewed Russia's territory as irredenta.

118. See Larson, "Bandwagon Images." For historical works on this subject, see Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances: 1926–1936* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); J.B. Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis: 1939–1941* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974); C.A. Macartney and A.W. Palmer, *Independent Eastern Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966); Anthony Tihamer Komjathy, *The Crises of France's East Central European Diplomacy: 1933–1938* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); and Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe Between the Wars: 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945).

119. For a discussion of distancing, see Randall L. Schweller, "Tripolarity and the Second World War," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 84, 87–92. Paul Schroeder calls this "hiding"; and John Arquilla introduces the term "bystanding," defined as a state's propensity to avoid conflicts for reasons of self-preservation. See Schroeder, "Neo-Realist Theory and International History"; and Arquilla, "Balances Without Balancing," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 1992.

so successfully from Cyclops: to be eaten last.¹²⁰ There are several good reasons for doing this. First, the distancing state can hope that, before its number comes up, the aggressor will exhaust itself or satisfy its appetite for expansion. As Winston Churchill remarked about the behavior of Europe's small powers: "Each one hopes that if he feeds the crocodile enough, the crocodile will eat him last. All of them hope that the storm will pass before their turn comes to be devoured."¹²¹

Second, as the predatory state or coalition gains in strength with each conquest, the threat to other powerful status-quo states that have hitherto remained on the sidelines grows. Consequently, they are more likely to unite against the aggressor, switching from neutrality or twilight belligerence to active balancing. Third, the status-quo power can hope that, as time goes by, the opposing revisionist coalition will fall apart because of disputes over the division of military burdens or over the spoils of victory. And finally, the state may seek to be eaten last because it believes that the expansionist policies of the predator state will prove too costly for the latter's own domestic public. The hope is that the hostile and expansionist government will be replaced by a more friendly one.

JACKALS. Jackals are states that will pay high costs to defend their possessions but even greater costs to extend their values. Like wolves, jackals are dissatisfied powers, but they value their possessions and so as expanders they tend to be risk-averse and opportunistic. To use a biblical metaphor: the jackal trails the lion to scavenge the scraps it leaves behind.¹²² While jackals are often found trailing wolves (revisionist leaders), they will also trail lions (status-quo leaders) who are on the verge of victory. Both forms of bandwagoning are examples of predatory buck-passing: attempts to ride free on the offensive efforts of others.

WOLVES. Wolves are predatory states. They value what they covet far more than what they possess. Like terminally ill patients, very hungry states are willing to take great risks—even if losing the gamble means extinction—to

120. Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 26.

121. Winston Churchill, *Blood, Sweat and Tears* (New York: G.P. Putnam's, 1941), p. 215.

122. The jackal principle is usually associated with Italy's traditionally opportunistic foreign policy. See A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 286; Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 227.

improve their condition, which they consider to be intolerable. Uninhibited by the fear of loss, they are free to pursue reckless expansion. As Hitler told his commanders in chief on the eve of war: "It is easy for us to make decisions. We have nothing to lose; we have everything to gain. . . . We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents will be risking a great deal and can gain only a little."¹²³

The historical record is replete with examples of states that sought to maximize or significantly increase their power, and put their own survival at risk to improve, not merely to maintain, their positions in the system. Alexander the Great, Rome, the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuries, Charles V, Philip II, Frederick the Great, Louis XIV, Napoleon I, and Hitler all lusted for universal empire and waged all-or-nothing, apocalyptic wars to attain it. Seeking to conquer the world or a large portion of it, wolves do not balance or bandwagon; they *are* the bandwagon.

BALANCE OF INTERESTS AT THE SYSTEMIC LEVEL

At the systemic level, balance-of-interest theory suggests that the distribution of capabilities, by itself, does not determine the stability of the system. More important are the goals and means to which those capabilities or influence are put to use: whether power and influence is used to manage the system or destroy it; whether the means employed to further such goals threaten other states or make them feel more secure. In other words, the stability of the system depends on the balance of revisionist and conservative forces. When status-quo states are far more powerful than revisionist states, the system will be stable. When a revisionist state or coalition is stronger than the defenders of the status quo, the system will eventually undergo change; only the questions of when, how, and to whose advantage remain undecided.

Because the terms status quo and revisionist are somewhat nebulous and difficult to operationalize, it is necessary to define them as precisely as possible. Status-quo powers seek self-preservation and the protection of values they already possess; they are security-maximizers, not power-maximizers.¹²⁴ For status-quo states, the potential gains from nonsecurity expan-

123. Hitler speech to the Commanders in Chief on August 22, 1939, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, Series D, Vol. VII (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 201.

124. It is often pointed out that power-maximizing is a somewhat murky concept. But the same can be said of security-maximizing. Some argue that absolute security requires universal empire. But this is just a semantic solution, as external insecurity becomes internal insecurity.

sion are outweighed by the costs of war. While they may seek to extend their values, status-quo states do not employ military means to achieve this end. For this reason, their interest in military power varies with the level of threat to their values.¹²⁵

In contrast, revisionist states value what they covet more than what they currently possess, although this ratio may vary considerably among their ranks; they will employ military force to change the status quo and to extend their values. For revisionist states, the gains from nonsecurity expansion exceed the costs of war. Needing preponderant power to overturn the status quo, dissatisfied states band together precisely when it appears that they will thus be stronger than the conservative side, for it is only then that they can expect to succeed in their expansionist aims.

Generally, revisionist powers are the prime movers of alliance behavior; status-quo states are the "reactors." Once again, Wolfers writes: "Because self-extension almost invariably calls for additional power, countries that seek self-extension tend to be the initiators of power competition and the resort to violence. Herein lies the significant kernel of truth in the idealist theory of aggression."¹²⁶ Aggressor states must exert initial pressure (that is, present a significant external threat) before satisfied powers will respond with counterpressure, which is often slow and reluctant. The vernacular of modern realism refers to this reaction as "balancing behavior," which the theory generalizes to apply to all states. But what, then, is the initial pressure exerted by the revisionist states called? In this light, it can be seen that the opposite of balancing is not bandwagoning, as today's realists claim, but rather aggression. In the absence of a reasonable external threat, states need not, and typically do not, engage in balancing. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Concert of Europe replaced the balance-of-power system in 1815, when all the war-weary Great Powers accepted and embraced the status-quo order.¹²⁷

125. On this point, Wolfers writes: "Self-preservation calls forth . . . a variety of attitudes toward power because countries which are satisfied to let things stand as they are have no immediate incentive for valuing power or for wishing to enhance it. Whether they become interested in power at all, and the extent to which they do, depends on the actions they expect from others. It is a responsive interest which takes its cue from the threats, real or imagined, directed at things possessed and valued. If policy is rationally decided, the quest for power here increases or decreases in proportion to these external threats." Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," in Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, p. 97.

126. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

127. Conversely, the system did not go from balance to concert after either world war this century because, in each case, some of the major powers did not view the new order as legitimate. For a different view, see Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of

The balance-of-power system returned with the outbreak of the Crimean War, when a revitalized France no longer accepted the status quo and instead sought to reestablish its prior hegemony over the Continent.

In short, the presence of Great Powers that are all known to accept the status quo and are unlikely to pursue unilaterally expansionist goals is a necessary and sufficient explanation for a Concert system; balance-of-power systems simply cannot survive under such conditions. Because in today's world "all major powers are coming to hold a common view of what constitutes an acceptable status quo," the current system is likely to go from balance to Concert.¹²⁸ Balance-of-interest theory, by focusing on variations in actors' preferences, can account for this change; structural balance-of-power theory and balance-of-threat theory cannot.

Conclusion

The question of whether balancing is more common than bandwagoning is a misleading one. They are not opposite behaviors. The motivation for bandwagoning is fundamentally different from that of balancing. Bandwagoning is commonly done in the expectation of making gains; balancing is done for security and it always entails costs. In practice, even Great Powers have chosen to remain on the sidelines in the hope of avoiding the high costs of balancing aggressively against powerful predatory states.¹²⁹ Many would not actively fight the aggressors until they were actually attacked. Conversely, bandwagoners, whether they are partners in crime or simply followers of a fashionable trend, do not attach high costs to their behavior. Instead, they

International Security Cooperation," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 58–79.

128. Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "A New Concert for Europe," in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), p. 251. Also see Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114–161.

129. In this regard, Churchill praises Britain for its traditional role of balancer precisely because, as such, it was the exception, not the rule: "Faced by Philip II of Spain, against Louis XIV under William II and Marlborough, against Napoleon, against William II of Germany, it would have been easy and must have been very tempting to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took the harder course, joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military tyrant, whoever he was, whatever nation he led." Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (New York: Bantam, 1961), pp. 186–187.

anticipate the advantages of being on the winning side. For them, alliances are a positive-sum game.

Rather than being opposite behaviors, bandwagoning and balancing are associated with opposite systemic conditions: balancing with stasis; bandwagoning with change. Accordingly, bandwagons roll when the system is in flux; either when the status-quo order starts to unravel or when a new order is being imposed. In the first instance, the rise of an unlimited-aims expansionist power will attract a following of lambs—vassal states too weak and frightened to defend their autonomy—and of jackal states, with their own revisionist aims to pursue. Sometimes, the status-quo order is destroyed by the decline of a dominant power, such as the demise of the Soviet Union and the wave of democratic revolutions that followed in 1989.

In the second instance, states pile on to the winning coalition at the end of large-scale wars to claim shares of the spoils or to escape the wrath of the victors. Here, states bandwagon to benefit from—or, at least, to avoid being damaged by—the peace settlement. Occasionally, a new order arises through peaceful means. Although it is perhaps too early to tell, the 1993 accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization has produced a bandwagon effect among the neighboring Arab states, each seeking its own settlement with Israel. As this last example shows, bandwagoning is not always, as the literature implies, a cowed response to an evil regime; it is often done voluntarily. Like change itself, bandwagon effects are feared by those who are content with the status quo and welcomed by those that are not.