

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AREA STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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On the television screen in front of me, in exquisite high definition details, a distinguished older gentleman speaking softly with a charming foreign accent discusses the war in Afghanistan, Revolution in Iran, the Palestine-Israel conflict, and Islamic extremism. While the friendly banter with the host, the professorial/grandfatherly white beard and the receding hairline lend the speaker an aura of authenticity and gravitas, it is his institutional affiliations, academic position(s) and book titles that give him discursive authority. The host, framed by the Stanford University's Hoover Institution's logo on the screen, having introduced himself as that institution's fellow and the guest as a colleague, has already rattled off a list of credentials including "former Princeton professor," "Hoover Research fellow," and "professor and the Director of the Middle East Studies Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University." The proceedings have the appearance of a rational and reasonable conversation about the region (the so-called *Middle East*) between two well-informed, knowledgeable scholars, even if one disagrees with every single statement they make. There is, however, something unsettling in the tenor of the conversation, in the phrasing of sentences, and in the attitude, one that I personally find troubling. Discussing history and current events of the region, the guest and the host use pronouns "we," "us" and "our" as in "our interests" or "we should do this or that." Whom do these ambiguous pronouns *we* and *us* refer to and what are *our* interests? Do they refer to those scholars who study the Middle Eastern culture, history and affairs? American society at large? Or perhaps, the host and the guest are acting as surrogates of the US government, evidenced by slippage from abstract theory to concrete political analysis to policy recommendation.

The above scene is neither exceptional nor a recent development. For decades, area studies scholars have had a robust public presence in the mainstream mass media. During the Iranian Revolution, before and after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and following the recent uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, Bernard Lewis, Fouad Ajami, and Abbas Milani and some of the other better-known

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contemporary area studies' public faces appeared on cable news programs, public television, webcasts, and radio to analyze these events and prescribe policy positions. Even though this high degree of public visibility is a new phenomenon, perhaps a sign of the times, the general public and even many people in academia might not be aware of the long history of area studies departments' involvement in foreign policy, intelligence and security matters, and inversely, the US military-intelligence role in founding and shaping area studies programs in the most elite higher education institution in this country in the beginning and everywhere else later. As I will argue in this article, this reciprocity is built in the structure of the field of area studies. The genesis, the historical development and the formation of various area studies programs during and after World War II have led to a blurring of the university borders and state interests.

While there is no denying that area studies programs have also produced valuable knowledge and espoused radical critical thought in the past 65 years, this article is an overview of the historical events that characterize the dominant discourses *governing* these programs. Of course, the interdisciplinary nature of the area studies enterprise makes it almost impossible to fix it with any set of characteristics consistently. At the same time, the uneasy and tenuous conjoining of two dissimilar fields to create area studies has produced a vast body of knowledge that is academically diverse and heterogeneous, but ideologically coherent and unified. The coming together of philologists, archeologists, historians and classics scholars, on one hand, and economists and political scientists, on the other hand, was not accidental: It was carefully and strategically planned to create academic programs that would both guide and legitimize US foreign policy.

This double function of area studies programs, that of producing academic "knowledge" (situated, contingent, and shot through an ideological prism) for specific areas and recommending and shaping governmental policies, has been the primary *raison d'être* for these programs. In fact as some¹ have argued, these are not separate functions, but different stages of the same process. Whatever our understanding of the link between the functions, there has been remarkable continuity in certain aspects such as articulating a neocolonial political topography by dividing the world into friendly/unfriendly regions, identifying and characterizing friends and enemies populating those regions (governments and social forces), training experts on political and cultural aspects of each constructed region, and making policy recommendations for various Republican and Democratic administrations. Enemies have changed, regions have been re-configured, but the basic functions of the programs remain the same. From 1942 to 1991, communism, the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence were the determining factors in how areas were partitioned and studied, while since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been a paradigm shift and drawing coherent boundary lines between areas

has become more complicated. Categories of “Islam” and “Islamic World” have been more instrumental than anything else in defining areas, enemies, friends, and strategies for hegemony and control in the newly re-drawn regions. Another aspect of the contemporary paradigm shift has been a change of emphasis on the term “democracy” as being an inextricable dimension of free enterprise and as antithetical to Islam and Islamic civilization. More on this paradigm shift later.

In the course of seven decades since the inception of the first area studies programs, the same kind of academic work that the classical Oriental programs used to produce such as the study of ancient civilizations in the “Middle East” and the “Far East” and dead languages have continued to be produced. However, this knowledge is now routinely, if not always, deployed by political scientists and international studies experts to draw conclusions about contemporary cultures of the countries in a region. The common link here between what I called above two dissimilar fields, housed originally in social sciences and humanities, was the act of cross-cultural translation. As philologists translated ancient texts and the classical scholars did the same to classical poetry and religious texts, political scientists and other social scientists translated contemporary cultures of these societies, which ranged from literary and visual culture to political discourse. Since the translation of contemporary culture demands literacy in modern literature and visual culture of societies under study, area studies programs either brought in people from comparative literature and film and media departments or had their existing classics and social science faculty teach and research contemporary cultural aspects of these societies. In either case, area studies were academic institutions dedicated to cross-cultural translation and as Robert J. C. Young (2003: 139-149) observes:

...[T]o translate a text from one language to another is to transform its material identity. With colonialism, the transformation of an indigenous culture into the subordinated culture of a colonial regime, or the superimposition of the colonial apparatus into which all aspects of the original culture have to be reconstructed, operate as processes of translational dematerialization. At the same time, though, certain aspects of the indigenous culture may remain untranslatable. As a practice, translation begins as a matter of intercultural communication, but it also always involves questions of power relations, and of forms of domination. It cannot therefore avoid political issues, or questions about its own links to current forms of power. No act of translation takes place in an entirely neutral space of absolute equality.

Area studies programs have been far from neutral spaces of research, as a close look at their history reveals. The cross-cultural translation that has taken place in area studies programs has been directly informed by the heritage of colonialism and readjusting former colonial interests of the Western powers for a series of succeeding world orders.

The origins of area studies, dating back to World War II and the period immediately after, are well-documented. It is no secret that the first beginnings of area studies are deeply entrenched in intelligence and military imperatives of the US government. Now, this history was openly and sometimes proudly acknowledged by those men who were present at the creation of area studies. Looking back at that moment (in the mid-1940s), McGeorge Bundy, the famous hawkish National Security Advisor to JFK and Johnson, and one-time Dean of Arts and Sciences and also Dean of Faculty at Harvard (1953-61), wrote in 1964:

It is a curious fact of academic history that the first great center of area studies...[was] in the Office of Strategic Services... It is still true today, and I hope it always will be, that there is high measure of interpretation between universities with area programs and the information gathering agencies of the government. (quoted in Cumings, 1999: 173)

As Bruce Cumings points out, Bundy was perfectly positioned to comment on this link: as a Harvard Dean, he made "life difficult for young scholars with political backgrounds that he or the FBI found suspect. He was also working with various Central Intelligence Agency projects" (173). According to Cumings, the declassification of American Archival Materials on the service to the state by many prominent academics is just becoming public, but from what we know, it appears that Bundy's involvement was the rule and not the exception (*ibid.*).² In addition to universities and state military and intelligence agencies, foundations such as Ford (through the mediation of the so-called independent non-governmental organization Social Science Research Council, SSRC) constitute the third side of the area studies triangle. Bundy at various points in his life served on each side of that triangle in key positions: despite holding only a Bachelor's degree, he was a Professor of Government at Harvard in the 1950s, and later, after retiring from his National Security Administration (NSA) position at state, he was appointed Professor of History at New York University from 1979 to 1989 and Scholar-in-Residence at the Carnegie Corporation from 1990 to 1996. I have already mentioned his tenure as a dean at Harvard and his NSA position; he was also instrumental in the implementation of the Marshall Plan and its more covert aspects such as CIA-backed illegal funding of anti-communist activities in Europe. He played a decisive role in the Bay of Pigs, Cuban Missile Crisis, and the expansion of the Vietnam War; however, what I feel is relevant to our considerations is his position as the president of the Ford Foundation from 1966 to 1979, the third side of the aforementioned triangle.

I use Bundy as an exemplary case here; while most academics were not necessarily as prolific as Bundy was, his close ties with CIA and state department were not uncommon in the postwar period (a period that might extend to our present) among many prominent academics. The fact that he so easily circulated from one node

of this matrix to another should also alarm us to the very close and inextricable interconnectedness of this configuration. Again, Cumings (1999: 186) comments:

...[The] incomplete but important evidence from the Mosely papers [that is Philip E. Mosely (1905-1972), President of the East European Fund and professor of international relations at Cornell and Columbia] suggest that the Ford Foundation, in close consultation with the CIA, helped to shape postwar area studies and important collaborative research in modernization studies and comparative politics that were later mediated through well-known Ford-funded SSRC projects... According to Christopher Simpson's study of declassified materials, however, this interweaving of foundations, universities, and state agencies (mainly the intelligence and military agencies) extended to the social sciences as a whole: "For years, government money...not always acknowledged as such—made up more than 75 percent of the annual budgets of institutions such as Paul Lazarfeld's Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, Hadley Cantril's Institute for International Social Programs at Princeton, Ithiel deSola Poole's CENTS program at MIT, and others." Official sources in 1952 reported that "fully 96 percent of all reported [government] funding for social sciences at that time was drawn from the U.S. military."

I think that this brief history will suffice as a broad outline of the conditions and the rationale behind the creation of area studies in the US and their support structures, but I have not commented on any pedagogical aspects of area studies. As Rey Chow (2006) points out, Edward Said describes area studies as a continuation of the old European Orientalism with a different pedagogical emphasis:

No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric language of the Orient; he begins instead as a social scientist and "applies" his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the especially American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France. (quoted 39-40)

Said uses the career of Sir Hamilton Gibb to illustrate the pedagogical shift in Orientalism in response to modern realities of the Orient. He uses two lectures delivered by Gibb eighteen years apart to trace the postwar shifts as embodied in the career of one scholar. In 1945, delivering the Haskell Lectures at the University of Chicago, Gibb talks about "the Arab mind" in the most Orientalist manner by characterizing the Arab Oriental mind as "lacking a sense of law" and the "Muslim [mind having an aversion to] the thought process of rationalism..." (quoted in Said, 1979: 106).

As Gibb was appointed the director of Harvard's Center for Middle East Studies in 1957, a position he held until 1966, his shifting attitudes reflect shifting paradigms in Orientalism trying to adjust its priorities with the realities of area studies. In a lecture delivered in 1963 entitled "Area Studies Reconsidered," he declared that

“The Orient is much too important to be left to the Orientalists” (quoted in Said, 1979: 106). Said summarizes the new attitude in Gibb’s formulation as one in which the job of “the Western experts on the Orient...is to prepare students for careers ‘in public life and business.’ What we need, said Gibb, is the traditional Orientalist *plus* a good social scientist working together: between them the two will do ‘inter-disciplinary’ work” (107).

Lest we think that this really means that Orientalism is ready to concede some of its age-old dogmas on the Orient in its encounter with the Western Social Sciences, Gibb was quick to remind his audience that the Orientalist’s expertise “will serve to remind his uninitiated colleagues in area studies that ‘to apply the psychology and mechanics of Western political institutions to Asian or Arab situations is pure Walt Disney’” (quoted in Said, 1979: 107). The result is that social sciences were mobilized to point out that Orientals fail to have democratic institutions or come to terms with women’s equality with men because they have failed to understand law, social rights and other contributions of the European Enlightenment. They are after all Orientals adhering to the seventh-century principles of Islam and, as Said articulates, or rather ventriloquizes Bernard Lewis and other modern Orientalists, “[H]istory, politics, and economics do not matter. Islam is Islam, the Orient is the Orient, and please take all your ideas about a left and a right wing, revolutions, and change back to Disneyland” (107).

Moving fast-forward to the post-1989 phase of area studies, after the demise of the Soviet Union, as one explores the link between area studies and military-intelligence state agencies, the persistent question comes up: How do area studies in this second phase search for new enemies, or as Rey Chow puts it much more explicitly in *The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work*, search for new military targets in order to rationalize their *raison d’être*? In response to the last two inquiries, I am interested in the “sudden” appearance of various “Democracy Projects,” mostly in the so-called Islamic/Middle Eastern programs, funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Freedom House. In a way, while these have not surpassed SSRC as a major player in meting out resources, they have at least changed some of the terms under which area studies programs interconnect with foreign policy issues and intelligence/military agencies. In contrast to the dominantly white, male, Eurocentric origins of area studies (a veritable good old boys club), in this new configuration, the role of immigrant/exilic/immigrant academics becomes increasingly more prominent as a way of authenticating and legitimizing the new area studies discourse.

Consider the following contemporary self-definition of a project called “The Iran Democracy Project,” which was initiated by Abbas Milani, the Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University and a visiting professor in the Department of Political Science.

The Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution was created to understand the process and prospects for democracy in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. The central goal is to help the West understand the complexities of the Muslim world, and to map out possible trajectories for transitions to democracy and free markets in the Middle East, beginning with Iran. The project also seeks to identify, analyze, and offer policy options on the existing obstacles to democratic transition and ways to remove them and to ensure that policy makers in Washington receive advice that is non-partisan and reliable. (Iran Democracy Project)

Abbas Milani perfectly represents the merging of two functions by his participation as a research fellow in the conservative political think-tank, Stanford's Hoover Institution, which also houses the Iran Democracy Project (IDP). His "expertise" is defined as "U.S./Iran relations, Iranian cultural, political, and security issues."³³ The Iran Democracy Project is linked to a Hoover initiative called "Diminishing Collectivism and Evolving Democratic Capitalism," which, again according to the IDP's website, is "an area of study that includes analysis and documentation of how totalitarian societies transition to freedom, representative government, and private enterprise." Apparently, IDP was initiated

[t]o understand the process and prospects for democracy in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. The central goal is to help the West understand the complexities of the Muslim world, and to map out possible trajectories for transitions to democracy and free markets in the Middle East, beginning with Iran. The project also seeks to identify, analyze, and offer policy options on the existing obstacles to democratic transition and ways to remove them and to ensure that policy makers in Washington receive advice that is non-partisan and reliable. The history of the Middle East in the last one hundred years has shown Iran to be a bellwether for the rest of the region in the areas of political, social, and economic reform. (Iran Democracy Project)

In the above two statements, we can see a smooth and seamless transition from the high moralism that saturates the Cold War language to a more pragmatic managerial (middle-management) tone. Not that the rhetoric is completely devoid of moralism—contrasting democracy with Islam after all is a moralistic gesture—but there is a surprisingly candid attitude about the political intentions and state policy implications of the initiative's academic research. One can attribute this new candor and openness of the aims of area studies programs, which is hardly limited to my IDP example, to a number of factors: the pervasiveness of the national security state, a different set of dynamics between universities and mediating institutions that collaborate with area studies programs such as NED and SSRC, and the Hoover's own conservative nature.

But what exactly does IDP's academic research consist of? Abbas Milani has been quite prolific in publishing books on contemporary Iranian history such as *The Shah* (2011), and *The Myth of the Great Satan: A New Look at America's Relations with Iran* (2010), and *The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution* (2009). All three books constitute part of a revisionist history that psychologizes and personalizes major events in Iran's recent past: conflicts over economic decisions, political oppression, social uprisings, and foreign policy decisions are attributed to personal quirks and leaders' disagreements. This shift of emphasis conveniently eliminates questions of class interest and conflict, imperialism, neocolonialism, and all structural factors that shape personalities and not the other way around. It is Milani's tireless effort to de-emphasize the popular notion that the US government has played a significant role in Iran's recent history which is absolutely fascinating. It is his contention that the US played a minor role in the 1953 coup against the democratically elected Mossadeq government. Milani argues that a popular uprising and the intervention of Iran's top clergy led by Ayatollah Kashani toppled the popular prime minister's government; the US had little to do with it. The other component of this revisionist history, explicitly articulated in Milani's book *The Shah*, is that various US governments and the Shah's regime were at odds over the Shah's undemocratic and oppressive measures. If the US ever interfered in Iranian affairs, it was to moderate the Shah's despotic and erratic behavior. Milani's account personalizes the political by transforming critical historical events, such as the 1953 coup or the 1978 Revolution, into personality clashes (the Shah vs. Khomeini). It also ignores/overlooks objective realities such as US oil interests in the region and Iran's geopolitical significance, while highlighting the personal ambitions of the Shah and his conflicts with various US presidents. One key consequence of this type of historiography is that it erases traces of continuity in US foreign policy by shifting the emphasis from objective interests to leaders' intentions and moral criteria. Thus, any past, present and future interference by the US in Iran's internal affairs is also rationalized and legitimized by the same analytical grid.

Now, if I may return to the scene that opens this piece, Milani was a ubiquitous presence on various news programs following Iran's contested 2009 elections. The rhetoric of Milani, IDP, the Hoover Institute, and the slogans of the Green Movement in Iran melded together, and it seemed that the democratic demands of the wronged voters in Iran were somehow aligned with IDP's and the Hoover Institute's concern for "free markets." There is the sudden realization that democracy is indeed an empty signifier that is used to mean many things to many people, or nothing at all, an undetermined quality that Milani and IDP define according to their own positions and interests. In reality, in the post-Soviet era of area studies programs specializing in the Middle East and/or Near East, there are many side projects and collaborations

with outside university institutions (governmentally-funded or private) that use monikers “democracy,” “democratic” and “freedom” in conjunction with “Islam,” “Islamic,” or “Muslim.”

While I will not be able to give an exhaustive list of all such programs, I have noticed a strong presence of organizations such as the Freedom House and National Endowment for Democracy (NED) as (partial) funding institutions that undeniably shape the philosophy, intellectual attitude and research interests of contemporary area studies programs. I will conclude this article with a brief mention of another well-known academic institution, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), which is home to the above-mentioned Fouad Ajami and the well-known autobiographer, Azar Nafisi. It is also the former home of Paul Wolfowitz and Francis Fukuyama. It is not guilt by association, but the exact mechanisms at work at SAIS that produce very similar academic and political projects. Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of the History and the Last Man* (1992), Fouad Ajami’s writings and positions, and Paul Wolfowitz’s are quite well-known, so I will point out the involvement of English literature professor Azar Nafisi in a program called “The Dialogue Project.”

The Dialogue Project is a multi-year initiative designed to promote—in a primarily cultural context—the development of democracy and human rights in the Muslim world. In doing so, the Dialogue Project also hopes to educate those in non-Muslim communities—whether they be policy makers, scholars, development professionals, members of the media, or ordinary citizens—in the complexities and contradictions that govern both Western relationships with and life in many predominantly Muslim societies around the world. (Dialogue Project, 2004)

In response to criticisms by Dabashi and others of her 2008 book *Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books*, Nafisi⁴ has stated that she is “more interested in arts and literature than politics,” but the Dialogue Project, housed at SAIS, is a decidedly political enterprise:

In pursuing democracy and human rights in the Muslim world, one must realize that the battle is both ideological and cultural in nature and must be met on these grounds. Too often, oppressive regimes and organizations have attempted to suppress any movement towards pluralism and democracy under the banner of ideological Islam, protecting tyranny in the name of religion. For this reason, the topics addressed by the Dialogue Project will be those that have been the main targets of Islamists and, as a result, are the most significant impediments to the creation of open and pluralistic societies in the Muslim world, including culture and the *myth of Western culture imperialism*, women’s issues, and human rights, among others. (Dialogue Project, 2004; emphasis added)

After one gets past the platitudes about democracy and pluralism, the key statement is the last sentence, which is very similar to IDP's attempts at a revisionist history to discount the historical role of colonialism and imperialism in the colonized and semi-colonized societies. It is the kind of conceptual framework that assigns blame for economic underdevelopment and cultural backwardness to the failures of non-Western countries having endured the colonial rule and imperialist interventions. One of the major contributors to the Dialogue Project is Freedom House, where Milani serves on the Board of Trustees.⁵

The problem is not so much deciding where the blame lies as it is oversimplifying, erasing and revising history when more clarification and precision are called for.⁶ Finally, "human rights" and "women's issues" function in a similar manner to democracy as floating signifiers. In the past decade, we have witnessed an unprecedented number of articles and books that may be categorized as Orientalist-Feminism, which has also a strong presence in area studies programs. The Dialogue Project belongs to this tendency, but how gender and sexuality issues in the Middle Eastern countries are mobilized in America and in the West in general for political purposes and even military intervention requires a separate discussion.

IDP and the Dialogue Project are two exemplary cases of the direction that area studies programs are taking in the post-Soviet era. I have tried to point out the continuities and discontinuities in two succeeding phases of area studies programs. In the new phase, the new emphasis on Islam, "democracy," "human rights," and "women's issues" has replaced anti-communist rhetoric. This article is a discussion of how boundaries between academic research and state security apparatus have constantly been blurred since the inception of the area studies. This blurring of the boundaries is particularly insidious since most policy decisions produced by such collaborations are based on factual distortions and misrepresentations. As mentioned, the programs have also been a haven for good scholarly work and critical voices so this article is in no way a call for getting rid of such programs. At the same time, since area studies continue to exert a strong influence on matters of life and death, war and peace, academic knowledge and policy recommendations emanating from them need to be constantly scrutinized, especially since the public may be less likely to be skeptical of the factual representations of prestigious scholarly institutions than they are of the government.

Notes

1. See Chow (2006) for a very detailed discussion of the link between military and epistemic dimensions of area studies including the name itself which implies reconnaissance missions before a bombing campaign.
2. Bundy was also a recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1969 by Lyndon Johnson.

3. Another aspect of Milani's history that makes his joint position as a Hoover fellow and the director of Iranian Studies even more interesting is accounted in his autobiography, *Tale of Two Cities: A Persian Memoir* (1996), in which he recounts his life story in Iran under the Shah's regime including his leftist activities (he belonged to a Maoist organization), his arrest, jail time and his eventual disillusionment with revolutionary politics. In a way, the autobiography is a classic conversion narrative that retrospectively rationalizes Milani's famous collaboration with the authorities that had arrested him and his eventual embracing of neoconservative values. In an unpublished paper (under consideration), I include an expanded discussion of the book, but I need to mention briefly that I consider the book and the way it frames Iranian culture and counter-poses it to Western liberal values as closely following Samuel Huntington's theory of the "Clash of Civilizations." In a 1993 *Foreign Policy* article under that title, Huntington summarizes his theory:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (22)

Even though Huntington sets up a dizzying array of civilizational spheres, he claims the main contemporary conflict is one between Islamic and Western civilizations. His theory has been rejected as racist, static, inaccurate, and mere speculation by many, including Edward Said and Paul Berman.

4. *Wikipedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azar_Nafisi (accessed March 10, 2011).
5. Freedom House is an international non-governmental organization based in Washington, DC that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom and human rights. Support for Freedom House is provided by individuals, but also by the United States government. It publishes an annual report assessing the degree of perceived democratic freedoms in each country, which is used in political science research. The organization was founded by Wendell Willkie and Eleanor Roosevelt in 1941, and describes itself as "a clear voice for democracy and freedom around the world." The group states "American leadership in international affairs is essential to the cause of human rights and freedom" and that this can primarily be achieved through the group's "analysis, advocacy, and action." Freedom House receives about 66 percent of its budget from the US government. *Wikipedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House (accessed March 15, 2011).
6. It is important to note that the Dialogue Project's website was not active at the time of writing this article, but I had gathered my information in 2004. SAIS's website gives no information about the cancellation of the program.

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Further Reading

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